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ABSTRACT 
The Impact of Realignment on Property Crime: Perspectives of Chiefs of Police 
by Daniel S. Llorens 
Realignment, instituted in October 2011, was California’s latest effort at prison 
reform by realigning responsibility for prisoners labeled nonviolent, non-serious, and non 
sex-related from the state to counties.  Many of these offenders were in state prison upon 
conviction of property crime offenses.  Realignment had a net decarcerative effect on 
offenders.  Simultaneously, California cities’ officer staffing levels shrunk during the 
great recession.  To determine what impact realignment may have had on property crime 
in small California cities, and to identify effective response strategies, property crime and 
officer staffing data was analyzed and a survey administered to the chiefs of those cities.  
Fifty-six California cities with a population of between 25,000 and 50,000 and 
their own police departments were studied.  This study analyzed data for the full year 
before and after realignment’s implementation, 2010 compared to 2012.  Analysis of 
these data indicated an overall trend of increase in property crimes reported to the police, 
and a significant decrease in officer staffing pre-and post-implementation.  Many of the 
36 chiefs who responded to the survey identified realignment as the primary factor in the 
increase of property crime, closely followed by overcrowding in their local or county jail.  
Of the response strategies offered in the survey, most chiefs said they had made progress 
on increasing partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies.  Finally, a majority of 
the chiefs identified increasing partnerships with allied agencies the most effective 
strategy followed by the creation or reorienting specialized units to respond to the issue 
of realigned offenders. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Government reported that 1,570,400 persons were imprisoned at the 
end of 2012, a staggering number comparable to the population of Philadelphia, PA and 
larger than the populations of 12 states, according to the US Census Bureau (DOF, 2014).  
Despite a recent trend downward in national prison population, (128,000 fewer 
admissions to prison compared to 2009), 18 states and the Federal Bureau of Prisons had 
more prisoners incarcerated than their reported capacity (Carson & Golinelli, 2013).  
While the US population grew by almost 25 million persons from 2002 to 2012, a 9% 
increase, crime reported to the police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
dropped 14% in the same decade (FBI, 2012).  Despite these data, evidence suggests 
Americans believed crime is increasing nationally, even as they generally believed crime 
in their communities is under control (Dugan, 2013).  
 In response to spiraling increases in crime beginning in the 1970s, California 
lawmakers responded with a get-tough approach and embarked on an ambitious program 
of building prisons.  Since the 1960s, punitive approaches resulting in longer sentences 
have received the get-tough appellation, as differentiated from “soft” approaches more 
focused on treatment and rehabilitation (Skoler, 1971).  Get-tough initiatives led to rising 
rates of incarceration, and California’s prison population rapidly outpaced prison 
capacities.  Until 1977 California afforded judges significant leeway in sentencing 
decisions through indeterminate sentencing (Ducart, 2013).  After the law was changed to 
a determinate sentencing model, inmate numbers in the state skyrocketed from 20,000 in 
1977 to 160,000 in 2011(Ducart, 2013).  As the number of inmates became increasingly 
unmanageable, California’s overcrowded prison population signaled a system incapable 
of providing basic services to inmates (Grattet & Hayes, 2013).  
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 As a result, men and women sentenced to prison in California petitioned the 
courts for relief in response to insufficient medical and psychological care.  The seminal 
cases on point were brought by two defendants, Ralph Coleman and Marciano Plata, who 
successfully argued California’s overcrowded prisons made even minimal medical and 
psychological care impossible, thus violating the 8th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
proscribing cruel and unusual punishment (Coleman, 2009 & Plata, 2007).  The courts 
joined the two cases as a class action and mandated California move expeditiously to 
reduce overcrowding by establishing a population ceiling by certain dates (Plata, 2007).  
The courts were silent on just how that lower threshold was to be met.  
 These court decisions forced California to investigate alternatives to conventional 
prison sentencing and housing in order to comply with the court’s order to reduce prison 
population.  In response to these legal setbacks wherein the state was a defendant, the 
California legislature passed, and Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. signed Assembly Bills 
109 and 117 into law in April 2011.  These laws, generally referred to collectively as AB 
109 or realignment, took effect October 1, 2011.  AB 109 reassigned responsibility for 
the state’s nonviolent, non-serious, and non sex-related offenders to counties in place of 
the traditional state correctional model.  Persons convicted of non-serious, non-violent, or 
non-sexual felonies were realigned to county authorities to serve their time and receive 
post-release supervision (AB 109, 2011).  Among felonies that previously could have 
merited a stint in state prison but were now considered non-serious, non-violent, or non-
sexual were those such as narcotics possession, narcotics possession for sale, and 
property crimes such as vehicle theft, fraud and burglary (AB 109, 2011).   
 Proponents argued public safety would improve since offenders would be 
supervised and treated at the county level, where they would presumably receive more  
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responsive services.  Efficiencies would emerge as nonviolent prisoners were realigned 
leaving behind only the most violent.  In summary, AB 109 was designed to create 
efficiencies through reduced recidivism (Petersilia & Lin, 2012).  
 Realigned offenders currently in California state prisons were transferred to local 
jails, to be supervised and treated through county departments of probation and health, 
and from late 2011 onward, future convicts would serve their time locally.  The rapid 
implementation of this law, from April to October of 2011, resulted in county probation 
and health departments, among others, not fully prepared for the onslaught of realigned 
offenders (Petersilia & Lin, 2012).  Once prisoners were realigned from the state to the 
counties, overpopulation issues migrated from prisons to county jails.  This caused 
sheriffs to release realigned offenders and other inmates sooner than anticipated, in what 
Rappaport (2013, p.210) called a “shell game”.  An example of this is the Los Angeles 
County Jail system, where realigned offenders were regularly sentenced to a year in jail 
for crimes that would have previously been eligible for state prison, with some inmates 
being sentenced to terms between 5 and 40 years (Rappaport, 2013).  
Municipal law enforcement agencies were not initially given resources to respond 
to realigned offenders.  Petersilia, et al, 2013, found AB 109 funds were given to 
counties, not cities, and most often allocated to probation departments, sheriff’s 
departments, health departments, public defenders or local nonprofits, not local police 
departments.  According to Jett & Hancock (2013), it is possible a county centric focus 
was based on the realization counties would bear the burden of rehabilitation, housing, as 
well as establishing evidence-based practices in treating offenders (Vitiello, 2013).   
Not wasting time, at least 32 of California’s 58 counties began $2 billion worth of 
jail building or expansion across the state (Rappaport, 2013).  Data gathered by Stanford 
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 University’s Criminal Justice Center strongly suggested jail overpopulation was 
becoming an emerging problem for California (Lawrence, 2013).  The Center 
documented an 11% increase in local jail populations in the 12-month period after 
realignment’s implementation, and early release of prisoners had increased statewide by 
56%.  Ironically, but indicative of the unsettling nature of realignment for county 
corrections, many of these jails were already under court decree to reduce overcrowding 
(Lawrence, 2013).  Although realignment was not designed to be an early release 
program, a natural displacement of offenders from jail to the community was the net 
effect, given the resultant jail overcrowding.  Offenders transferred from state prisons to 
county jails and offenders now sentenced to county jails caused some sheriffs to 
liberalize their release policies for other jail inmates.   
Additional research on recent prison reform was needed to determine how 
realignment has impacted public safety in California communities, and what strategies 
could be employed by local law enforcement agencies to mitigate negative consequences.  
Spencer and Petersilia (2013) were the first to inquire how realignment affects 
communities, and importantly, crime victims.  Additional research may determine what 
impact realignment has had on property crime in California communities, and how 
realignment has affected municipal police agencies, especially those with modest or 
shrinking resources.  
Background 
National Crime Trends 
 
 Inmates became residents of state institutions following a conviction for a felony 
offense.  These incidents were usually brought to the attention of the police by a victim or 
witness, which ultimately resulted in an arrest, conviction, and a term in prison.  Tracking  
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crime incidents has been the responsibility of the police and has proven valuable in 
judging the effectiveness of anti-crime strategies and the level crime in a community, 
relative to others. 
 National crime trends vary greatly from region to region, and care must be taken 
when attempting to draw conclusions from data gathered from so diverse a nation.  Cities, 
for example, tend to have higher crime rates than suburbs, particularly as the discussion 
relates to violent crime, and all such populated tend to be more prone to crime than more 
rural areas (Jargowsky & Park, 2009).  The annual Uniform Crime Report aggregated by 
the FBI explicitly warned against “comparing statistical data of individual reporting units 
from cities, metropolitan areas, states, or colleges or universities solely on the basis of 
their population coverage” (FBI, 2012, National Summary).  According to the National 
Research Council’s exhaustive 2008 report on crime in the United States, the country 
overall saw significant decreases in robberies and murders after the subsidence of the 
crack cocaine epidemic of the 1980s.  The report identified decreases in property crimes 
such as burglary and auto theft, to which the authors attributed a possible increase in 
sanctions for those crimes.  More recently, the FBI reported that for 2012, violent crime 
incidents  rose .7% from 2011, but property crime incidents dropped .9 %, which was the 
tenth consecutive year property crimes have diminished nationally (FBI, 2012).  As for 
the rates of crime, or incidents per 100,000 inhabitants in a given year, the rate of crime 
has dropped almost 50% in the last twenty years (FBI, 2012).  
California Crime Trends 
 
 California’s crime rates were also lower than a decade ago.  In 2002, the rate of 
violent crime in the state was 594 incidents reported per 100,000 inhabitants, or 28% 
higher than in 2012 (FBI, 2012).  In 2002, the property crime rate was 17% higher than in 
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2012 (FBI, 2012).  In 2012, California had a violent crime rate of 423 incidents per 
100,000 inhabitants, 3.5% higher than the State of New York and Texas, and a property 
crime rate of 2,759 per 100,000, also higher than New York but lower than Texas (FBI, 
2012).  California’s 2012 rates of violent crime were also much higher in cities than in 
rural areas by 11%, and 15% higher property crime rates in cities compared to rural areas 
(FBI, 2012).  
Three Strikes and You’re Out 
 
 Evidence of California’s get-tough response to crime or the perception of crime 
was embodied in “three strikes and you’re out,” as habitual offender legislation is 
commonly called.  The existence of three strikes laws, in place in 25 of the 50 states by 
2005, drew significant public attention (Chen, 2008).  Identifying a nexus to California’s 
issues with overcrowding, Chen (2008) found California’s implementation of three 
strikes was stricter than other states and more enthusiastically utilized, resulting in 87,500 
offenders being sentenced under the law, including 7,500 who received a life sentences 
from 1994-2005.  Chen (2008) concluded three strikes laws deterred crime through 
incapacitation but also significantly contributed to California’s prison overpopulation 
problem.  
Prison Overcrowding  
 Research suggested that over the past few decades California’s policy makers 
have struggled with balancing issues of overcrowding, sentencing reform, outpatient 
treatment, resource allocation, and public safety concerns.  Overcrowding in America’s 
correctional institutions had a long history and many proximate causes.  Nearly 20 years 
ago research demonstrated the futility of a get-tough on crime approach which succeeded 
in filling local jails but resulted in unintended consequences, such as increased litigation 
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and facilities made more dangerous for inmates and staff (Kinkade, 1995).  Loury (2007) 
stated that over-reliance on punitive responses to crime implicate racial disparity in 
sentencing and disproportionately reflect one’s rank in the social hierarchy.  Other 
research confirmed disparate racial impacts from get-tough laws such mandatory 
sentencing or anti-gun laws imprisoning higher numbers of poor African-American men 
compared to poor white men (Schlesinger, 2008).  Recent trends included reform through 
sentencing changes, including California’s realignment efforts, and have reduced 
American prison population for the last three consecutive years (Cadora, 2014).  
California’s Broken System 
 In 1965, Governor Edmund G. “Pat” Brown signed the Probation Subsidy Act.  
Enacted to alleviate overcrowding by favoring treatment and programming over 
incarceration, the law reduced prison populations but significant increases in crime led to 
public resentment against the law (Rushford, 2012).  A backlash against prisoner releases 
from 1966 to 1970 led to get-tough reforms and significant spikes in prison populations 
between 1986 and 2006 (Grattet & Hayes, 2013; Rushford, 2012).  Highly publicized 
criminal acts such as the kidnap and murder of 12-year old Polly Klass by career criminal 
Richard Allen Davis in 1993 led directly to California’s three strikes law in 1994 
(Rushford, 2012).  Many writers agreed the passage of California’s three strikes law was 
the modern apex of a get-tough posture in the state (Caulkins, 2001; Kieso, 2005; Walsh, 
2007) and that the preeminence of crime control over other correctional models followed 
suit nationwide (Austin, et al, 1999).   
 Thus, the stage was set.  In California, get-tough on crime responses preceded 
overpopulation which predictably resulted in litigation.  To highlight the breadth of the 
overpopulation issue in the context of three strikes, Pontell and Welsh (1994) found  
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instances where orders from judges to reduce population were simply ignored by local 
authorities.  A series of California governors failed to energize the public and the 
legislature to enact significant reforms and head off the conflict between California and 
the courts.  
 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger came into office with an agenda to address 
California’s correctional problems with reforms designed to tackle overpopulation and 
the rising costs of traditional sentencing, housing and treatment models.  In 2007, after 
political pressure from corrections officer unions and others derailed what would have 
been a predecessor to realignment in 2005, the prestigious Little Hoover Commission 
warned prophetically:  
California’s prisons are out of space and running out of time…The Governor and 
Legislature must find the political will to move past rhetoric and address ways to 
solve the prison population crisis and make good on promises to improve public 
safety.  “Tough on Crime” sentencing laws have to be judged by outcomes and 
matched with fiscal responsibility.  To ensure public safety, reforms will have to 
jettison posturing to make room for smart on crime policies.  (Little Hoover 
Commission, 2007, p.1) 
 Warnings went unheeded, and by the end of 2007 over 170,000 men and women 
were held in California state prisons (Schlanger, 2012).  Apart from the causes of 
California’s overcrowded correctional institutions, the collective voices of litigants would 
soon be heard at the highest levels of American jurisprudence.  
Coleman and Plata Decisions 
 Ralph Coleman was an inmate in California’s state prison system that filed suit in 
1990 alleging non-existent care for his mental health issues (Coleman, 1995).  As  
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Coleman painstakingly made its way through the courts, another inmate, Marciano Plata, 
sued California for inadequate medical care (Plata, 2007).  Eventually, these cases were 
joined and presented to a panel of three federal judges, who in 2009 ordered California 
prison authorities to reduce the state’s prison population to 137% of capacity (Plata, 
2007).  One of those federal judges, Thelton Henderson, was blunt in his condemnation, 
“[I]t is an uncontested fact that, on average, an inmate in one of California’s prisons 
needlessly dies every six to seven days due to constitutional deficiencies in the 
[California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s] medical delivery system” 
(Plata, 2007, p.1372).  
 The state appealed to a divided United States Supreme Court, which upheld the 
three-judge panel’s decision, and ordered California to comply with the panel’s order.  
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the 5-4 majority, acknowledged what had become 
apparent to a long line of jurists; California’s lack of medical and psychological care for 
inmates, resulting primarily from overpopulation, placed the state in direct contravention 
to the United States Constitution.  In response to the minority opinion, which called the 
majority decision reckless, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, admitted “The 
release of prisoners in large numbers—assuming the State finds no other way to comply 
with the order—is a matter of undoubted, grave concern” (Brown vs. Plata, 2011, 
p.1921).   
Assembly Bill 109 
 The California legislature’s contemplation of what later became AB 109 actually 
predated the Supreme Court’s decision, and was signed into law by Gov. Edmund G. 
Brown Jr. in April 2011 (Schlanger, 2012).  Offenders previously and from that time 
forward convicted of non-serious, nonviolent, and non-sexual-related crimes or “non- 
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non-nons” would serve their time in local county jails instead of state prison.  Offenders 
convicted of such non-non-non offenses would now be supervised by a county probation 
department and subject to early release from supervision if they remained free of 
subsequent violations.  Revocation of probation of probation violations would also be 
handled at the local level and offenders would serve local jail time (Schlanger, 2012).  
Schlanger concluded that the shift of offenders from state prison to local jails “has the 
potential to be decarcerative because it shifts prisoners from low-discretion state custody 
to high-discretion county custody” (p.191).  The discretion referred to was with respect to 
a county sheriff or probation officer.  According to the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation, in the year following AB 109 implementation, from 
October 2011 to October 2012, California prison population decreased by 23,000, but jail 
population only grew by 6,000 persons (CDCR, 2013).  This meant a significant number 
of offenders were thus out of custody, or displaced.  The CDCR also documented the 
displacement effect on local jails; by June 2013, 35 counties reported releasing inmates 
because of overcrowding, and, “to a modest degree, convicted felons sentenced to jail and 
parolees serving time in jail for technical violations were displacing pretrial detainees as 
well as sentenced inmates serving time for misdemeanor offenses” (CDCR, 2013, p.4). 
The transfer of state’s prison overcrowding issues onto county jails, or what Schlanger 
called the “hydra threat” (2012, p. 210), were being raised by other writers regarding the 
efficacy and timing of realignment.  For example, King (2012) notes realignment did not 
sufficiently fund drug treatment, the primary reason many offenders faced incarceration.  
In addition, a study concluded in late 2013 by Stanford University’s Criminal Justice 
Center sought to draw out the impact of realignment from across the broad spectrum of 
the state’s criminal justice practitioners.  During the course of this study Petersilia (2013)  
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found police and sheriff’s departments were among the most negatively impacted.  
Petersilia (2013) quoted one stakeholder who called adjusting to realignment was like 
“drinking from a fire hose” and concluded, “our interviews elicited a portrait of counties 
struggling, often heroically, to carry out an initiative that was poorly planned and 
imposed upon them almost overnight, giving them little time to prepare” (p.7).  Other 
issues being faced by community corrections professionals include increased health care 
costs as older inmates who were being housed for longer periods of time (Vitiello, 2013) 
and the overall increase of stress and violence for inmates and staff in local jail facilities 
(Lynch, 2013).  
Crime Rates and Police Staffing 
 In a possible correlation with previously mentioned increases in American prison 
population in the 1990s, McCarty, Ren, & Zhao (2009) highlighted the 7% increase in 
police officers nationwide in the 1990s and how an increase in crime led to increased law 
enforcement expenditures.  Chief among these expenditures at the national level was the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which allocated $10 billion 
for prison construction and subsidized the hiring of up to 100,000 new police officers 
nationwide (USDOJ Fact Sheet, 1994).  Whether such significant increases in police 
officers across the nation negatively or positively impacted crime is a matter of debate.  
Kleck & Barnes (2010) recognized scholarly support for the general deterrence 
hypothesis; more officers might deter criminal acts, but this theory was not proved 
empirically.  They also cast doubt on the incapacitative effect of more officers making 
more arrests, which lead to less crime; but provided no data to support this assumption.  
Clear & Frost (2014) acknowledge the functional benefit of incapacitation as it relates to 
reductions in some crimes, but applauded the end of the “punishment imperative”, or the  
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mass incarceration of Americans (p.15).  As if to underline the theoretical disparity 
further, Ball (2011), in his study of prison sentencing and crime rates noted the vast 
differences in how each of California’s 58 counties sentenced persons to state prison.  
Ball (2011) pointed out that in the decade before realignment, those counties who sent the 
most inmates to prison had the lowest violent crime rates. 
 As for current trends in law enforcement staffing, Wilson & Heinonen were 
among many who acknowledged police personnel challenges were complicated by “an 
economic downturn, increasing attrition, a decreasing pool of qualified candidates, fewer 
resources, and expanding officer responsibilities” (2011, p.278).  Gascon & Foglesong 
(2010) also concluded that a steady increase in demands for police services and the 
exponentially more complex nature of modern law enforcement complicate the debate as 
to whether more police make communities safer.  To add to the complexity by 
acknowledging the inevitable political dimension, Stucky (2005), argued a city’s political 
leaders were attuned to the public’s perceptions of safety, which in turn affect that 
agency’s law enforcement response to crime.  
 Resource reductions made by cities due to the current recession contravenes the 
precepts of rational public choice theory, that citizens will appropriately resource law 
enforcement to combat real or perceived increases in crime (McCarty, et al, 2009).  In 
contravention to this theory and due to reduced tax revenues, governmental budgets have 
been slashed nationwide, with concomitant reductions in police staffing; about 12,000 
officers laid off in 2011 and 30,000 sworn positions simply left unfilled (Wilson & 
Weiss, 2012).  One recent study which analyzed 24 police agencies, 15 from California, 
rendered the following opinion regarding the impact of the recession, “It appears that 
when cities or counties reduce the number of sworn police officers as a result of bad  
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economic conditions or other factors, the crime rate tends to increase” (Guffey, Larson & 
Kelso, 2010, p.39).  According to the FBI’s latest Uniform Crime Report that also tracks 
police strength nationwide, from 2008 to 2012 California’s sworn officer staffing 
dropped 5.2% or about 3,700 officers (2012).  
 Realignment’s legislative language authorized $4.4 billion to counties through 
2016-2017, but Petersilia & Lin (2012) acknowledged this money is funneled through 
counties and not directly to cities or municipal law enforcement.  AB 109 permitted each 
of California’s 58 counties to craft individual realignment spending priorities at the 
county level.  These spending plans have been diverse; some counties spending as high as 
70% or as low as 5% of their funding on local law enforcement (Petersilia & Lin, 2009).  
Ducart (2013, p.503) recognized the same issue with realignment’s county-centric 
formula, calling attention to, “the non-uniformity that it creates amongst the counties.  
Some C[ommunity] C[orrection] P[artnership]s use Realignment's financial incentives by 
funding jail development, while others are trying to integrate further community-based 
sentencing options.” 
Statement of the Research Problem 
 Lofstrom and Rafael (2013) estimated about 18,000 individuals who would 
normally be locked up in state prison have made their way into local communities.  Their 
investigation also indicated a possible correlation between the implementation of 
realignment and a subsequent increase in property crimes among California’s most 
populous counties (Lofstrom & Rafael, 2013).  California’s first report which sought to 
track almost 59,000 offenders as they left the prison system to community corrections did 
not reassure; the state found recidivism rates pre- and post-realignment were about equal 
(CDCR, 2013). 
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 Little is known about how smaller municipal entities, bereft of the resources of 
their larger sister agencies, withstood the initial impact, if any, of realignment.  California 
cities with populations of 25,000 to 50,000 and their own municipal police departments 
in particular had the potential to be affected.  Such police departments expect their 
officers to be generalists; the resources for specialized units to track and impede repeat 
offenders were likely not available.  Such agencies possibly felt the effects of the current 
recession, and its accompanying reduction of resources normally allocated for law 
enforcement.  Further investigation is needed to determine if and to what extent 
realignment impacted smaller communities, and whether a reduction of sworn officers, if 
it occurred, affected their ability to deal with realignment.  During the time period 
contemplated by this study, realignment, the recession, police staffing, and jail 
overcrowding may have been variables that impacted property crime.  Without input 
directly from the chiefs, to what extent property crime has been influenced by these 
variables would remain unknown.  Understanding the speed and effectiveness of response 
strategies such as agency collaboration, alternative funding, specialized units, and other 
non-traditional partnering would be critical, especially in the context of a groundbreaking 
prison reform initiative such as realignment.  Since realignment is a novel approach in 
California, information on how effectively and how quickly chiefs responded would 
remain unknown.  
Purpose Statement 
 The primary purpose of this descriptive correlational study was to identify policy 
initiatives that could lead to more effective law enforcement against challenges presented 
by prison realignment for small California cities.  The second purpose of this study was 
to determine the relationship, if any, between sworn officer staffing and property crimes 
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 reported to the police from 2010 to 2012.  The third purpose of the study was to 
determine the significance of the impact of realignment, sworn officer staffing, the 
recession, and jail overcrowding on property crime as perceived by police chiefs.  
Finally, it was the purpose to identify the progress and effectiveness of specific strategies 
in response to realignment; increased law enforcement partnerships, seeking alternative 
funding, altering staffing models, and engaging non-law enforcement stakeholders as 
perceived by police chiefs. 
Research Questions 
 This paper proposes to answer the following questions regarding California cities 
with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that have their own police departments: 
1) To what extent is there a difference in property crimes in 2010 and 2012?  
2) To what extent is there a difference in sworn police officer staffing in 2010 
and 2012?  
3) To what extent is there a correlation between changes in sworn officer staffing 
and changes in property crime for 2010 and 2012? 
4) To what extent were the following factors significant with respect to property 
crime within the jurisdictions from 2010-2012? 
a. AB 109 Public Safety Realignment 
b. The current economic recession 
c. The police department’s sworn officer staffing levels 
d. County or local jail overcrowding 
5)  To what extent do chiefs perceive that progress has been made in the 
following strategies responding to realignment?  
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies 
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b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants 
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments 
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned 
probationers 
 6)  How effective do chiefs perceive the following strategies are in response to     
realignment? 
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies 
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants 
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments 
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned 
probationers 
Significance of the Problem 
 The movement of inmates from the custody of the state to local communities has 
the potential to affect public safety.  With about 23,000 prisoners realigned  since 
October 2011 and thousands more displaced from local jails, scholars have only recently 
begun exploring outcomes, and much of the focus has been on recidivism, not crime 
impact (Schlanger, 2012).  Sizable numbers of offenders released from incarceration well 
before their sentences were to end may well stress police staffing beyond the point of 
being able to protect against property crimes.  This may in turn place additional financial 
burdens on municipalities as they struggle to provide adequate police services.  
Accordingly, the significance of the problem is one of public policy and public safety.    
 California’s version of realignment, or the reduction of prison eligible crimes and 
the transfer to local authorities for responsibility of offender housing, supervision and 
treatment, is unprecedented in the country if for no other reason than its scale.  This study 
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 seeks to add to information available to policy makers about the impact on property 
crimes of reducing the offenses that merit prison and realigning offenders to local 
communities, especially whose police departments were understaffed.  Finally, this study 
seeks to inform on the effectiveness and tempo of strategies those chiefs may have 
contemplated in response to realignment.  
Theoretical and Operational Definitions 
Board of State and Community Corrections (BSCC).  A 13-person board established 
by law with some members appointed by the governor and the legislature and are 
chartered to make evidence-based, best practice recommendations informing state and 
local correctional policy. 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR).  This department 
is responsible for the housing, care, and post-release supervision of the state’s convicted 
felons.  Previously known as the California Department of Corrections (CDC). 
County Corrections Partnership (CCP).  A working group established previous to, but 
later expanded by, AB 109, consisting of a county’s chief probation officer, district 
attorney, a chief of police, the public defender, health director, presiding judge, and 
county supervisor.  It has been empowered by AB 109 to set funding priorities for monies 
received from the state. 
Decarceration.  Strategies, policies, or laws that have the cumulative effect of moving 
persons from the custodial environment to those out of custody (Gartner, et al, 2011).  
Determinate sentencing.  The current law in California for serious crimes: upon 
conviction, an offender is sentenced to a fixed term of which a significant percentage 
must be served before parole is contemplated, if at all. 
Deterrence theory.  First developed 250 years ago, this theory holds that criminals 
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adjust their behavior depending on the severity, celerity, and certainty of punishment: the 
more efficiently and certainly society employs swift punishment appropriate to the crime, 
the better to deter that activity (Apel, 2013).  
Felony.  Specific intent crimes such as murder, rape, arson, vehicle theft or burglary, 
whose conviction is punishable by death, or imprisonment in the county jail or state 
prison. 
Incapacitation theory.  Crime is prevented when offenders are incarcerated because 
their inability to victimize others is assured; determining how much crime is prevented is 
the subject of some debate (Zimring & Hawkins, 1995).   
Indeterminate sentencing.  In California, until 1977, most offenders convicted of 
criminal acts were given sentences with broad ranges, allowing for an inmate to meet the 
low range and subsequently seek parole assuming good behavior.  
Misdemeanor.  Crimes such as drunk driving, theft of less than $900, or prostitution 
whose conviction is punishable by a fine or imprisonment in the county jail for not more 
than one year or both.  
Non-non-non.  As outlined by AB 109, convicted felons eligible for realignment with a 
most recent conviction for a non-violent, non-sexual, non-serious crime.  
Parole.  State level supervised release.  A defined period of time, usually three years, 
after the service in the state prison.  The state can stipulate terms of behavior, reduced 
constitutional protections against government searches and seizures, and subject to 
sanctions by the parole board upon an evidence-based hearing. 
Post release community supervision (PRCS).  Under realignment, county probation 
departments take over supervision of inmates considered “non-non-nons”, and supervise 
their adherence to probation terms, treatment, and service delivery.  This was previously  
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the job of state Department of Correction parole officers.  
Probation.  County level supervised release.  Formal probation is of a defined duration, 
can stipulate terms of behavior, usually includes reduced constitutional protections 
against government searches and seizures, and is subject to revocation by the court or by 
a probation officer upon showing of cause. 
Property Crime.  A crime event reported to the police wherein the victim suffers some 
loss of monetary value such as vehicle theft, burglary, embezzlement, or fraud.  
Rational public choice theory.  Resource allocations made by public policy makers is 
akin to the relationship of supply and demand; the citizenry will resource public safety 
appropriately when faced with the need for protection against crime (McCarty, et al, 
2009). 
Realignment (AB 109, or Public Safety Realignment).  California’s most recent 
attempt to reform state and community corrections by realigning non-violent state 
prisoners to county jails and re-classifying certain felonies as ineligible for state prison.  
Signed into law by Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. along with companion bill AB 117 
and effective October 1, 2011, later amended by AB 118, AB 116, and AB 17, regarding 
technical changes and funding structure (Fazzi, 2013).  
Split Sentencing.  A sentencing formulation introduced by realignment dividing custody 
time between terms in the county jail followed supervision by the county for low level 
offenses.  This process allows judges to give inmate an early opportunity to interact with 
probation and access post-release services (Pennypacker & Thompson, 2013). 
Sworn Police Officer.  A police department employee certified by the California 
Commission on Police Officer Standards and Training as having met the requirements of 
a police officer though a combination of experience and training, and sworn by a duly  
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constituted authority to make arrests per Penal Code §832.  Sworn officers are 
distinguished from professional staff such as dispatchers, cadets, or police service 
officers.  Others, such as California Highway Patrol officers and county sheriff’s deputies 
are sworn officers per Penal Code § 832, but are not the focus of this study. 
Three strikes law.  Modern iteration of habitual offender laws designed to punish 
persons convicted of three or more felony convictions.  California’s 1994 version 
required persons convicted of a two serious felonies or “strikes” to serve at least 80% of 
their sentence before eligibility for parole, and persons convicted of a third serious felony 
to serve a term of not less than 25 years to life. 
Uniform Crime Report (UCR).  Annual report issued by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation containing aggregated data of among other thing, crimes reported to the 
nation’s law enforcement agencies. 
Violent Crime.  Crime event reported to the police resulting in the murder, rape, or 
significant bodily injury perpetrated on a victim; sometimes referred to as crimes against 
persons. 
Delimitations 
 Delimiting factors or variables are those that narrow the way in which findings 
can be generalized (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010).  The present study is delimited by 
the unique nature and scope of realignment, therefore, this study is delimited to police 
departments in California cities with populations between 25,000 to 50,000.  Findings 
cannot be generalized outside California because no other state or territory has 
contemplated such a significant realignment from state to community corrections.  The 
population and sample also delimits further extrapolation because only cities with 
populations between 25,000 to 50,000 were being studied.  Smaller or larger cities would  
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have different economic and demographic makeups significantly limiting the value of 
any findings.  The cities in the population and sample were served by their own police 
departments, not the county sheriff, usually the largest law enforcement in a county, thus 
delimiting findings that highlight limited resources.  This study seeks insight as to the 
impact of crimes against property, not violent crimes, which were categorized differently, 
have much longer jail or prison terms attached, and often arise from something other than 
a personal gain motive.  Finally, this study seeks information from police chiefs 
representing their police departments.  Executives of agencies within a county such as 
chief probation officers, sheriffs, prosecutors or public defenders would have different 
responsibilities and insights.  
Organization of the Study 
 The remainder of the study is organized into four chapters, a bibliography, and 
appendixes.  Chapter II presents the historical overview of crime in the United States and 
California, reporting methods, trends towards get tough policies, the resultant 
overcrowding in California prisons, the implementation of realignment and its impact on 
state and local authorities and jurisdictions.  Chapter III explains the research design and 
methodology of the study.  This chapter includes an explanation of the population, 
sample and data gathering procedures as well as the procedures used to analyze the 
collected data.  Chapter IV presents, analyzes and provides a discussion of the findings of 
the study.  Chapter V contains the summary, findings, conclusions, recommendations for 
actions and further research.   
 Thus, we see that national and state get-tough legislation drove increasing levels 
of incarceration resulting in overcrowding, leading to demands for reforms.  Since at least 
2008, the recession has negatively impacted municipalities resulting in reduced law  
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enforcement staffing.  Overcrowding in California led to a series of court decisions 
mandating the state immediately reduce its prison population.  In response, AB 109 and 
AB 117 were passed in 2011, resulting in reduced prison population and transferal of the 
corrective and supervisory burden for these inmates to county and local authorities.  This 
process, known as realignment, has had an overall decarcerative effect at the local level.  
By transferring overcrowding issues from the state prisons to county jails, local 
authorities sought to strike a balance between public safety and the prospect of 
overcrowded jails.  How effectively this balance has been struck, in conjunction with 
efforts by local police departments facing personnel cuts, required further inquiry and 
analysis.  The following chapter expored in greater depth the existing literature regarding 
the provenance and root causes for national and state prison overcrowding.  Drivers of a 
get-tough approach to criminal behavior through sentencing were explored along with the 
consequences of this approach.  The chapter reviewed findings from writers regarding the 
scope and effect of overcrowding in California prisons and the path that eventually led to 
court-ordered reform.  A review of the nation’s efforts to quantify and classify crime was 
included since it foundational to the analysis of crime in the United States, including 
issues with underreporting of crime by certain populations.  The chapter explored the 
effect of the recession on local municipalities, and the overall reduction in police staffing.  
The scholarly debate on to what degree police staffing levels help deter crime was 
presented as well as the parallel debate on the value of incapacitation of criminals 
through imprisonment.  The path that led to realignment via the courts was outlined, as 
well as the reform that it spawned, namely, realignment.  How realignment has been 
implemented, including the allotment of resources and current data of the impact to local 
stakeholder was included.  
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CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 According to California’s Little Hoover Commission, at the height of its 
overcapacity, the state housed 173,000 inmates in 33 prisons designed to accommodate 
half that amount (Little Hoover Commission, 2007).  AB 109 came about as a result of 
overcrowding in California’s state prisons and the resultant substandard healthcare 
provided to the state’s inmates.  AB 109 reclassified certain felonies so persons thus 
convicted would serve time in community correctional facilities as opposed to state 
prisons, and be supervised and treated locally rather than by state authorities.  
 The goal of AB 109 was to strike a new path in corrections reform that would 
simultaneously reduce California’s prison population to constitutional levels, reduce state 
costs by shifting the burden of supervision of thousands of inmates to the state’s 58 
counties, and reduce recidivism through improved programmatic efficiencies created by 
local control.  Simultaneously, many California municipalities were feeling the impact of 
the great recession, with the net effect of the stagnation or loss of sworn police officer 
positions.  
 The following is a review of the literature on issues foundational to the purpose of 
the study, such as national and state get-tough approaches to crime that led in part to 
overcrowding and AB 109.  This chapter will also review the literature on the impact of 
the current recession on cities, police staffing relational to crime control efforts, policing 
strategies, and the impact of prison reform on stakeholders. 
Review of the Literature 
Get-tough Approach 
Popular and political pressure.  The “knee jerk” reaction to heinous crimes by 
policy makers has often led to get-tough approaches and more stringent penalties to a 
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wider variety of criminal acts (D’Elia, 2010).  In California, the murder by Richard Alan 
Harris of Polly Klaas elevated the demand for get-tough approaches such as three strikes 
into the highest level of California politics (Zimring, et al, 2001).  Cullen, Fisher & 
Applegate (2000) found that public perception of crime and punishment tended to be 
more repressive and less rational when the intricacies of the justice system were least 
understood.  Chambliss (2001, p.9) spoke for many reform-minded writers, “There is, in 
short, a huge chasm between the reality of crime, the public’s perception of it, and the 
information being disseminated to the public by law enforcement agencies, the media, 
and politicians.”  Zimring (et al, 2001, p.155) agreed, although they acknowledge the 
“nasty mood’ in the nation regarding control of crime was properly attributable to 
frustrations about skyrocketing crime rates.  Get-tough approaches invariably led to 
higher incarceration rates, leading some to question the fairness of higher rates of 
incarceration, and incarceration itself as a crime prevention tool (Nagin, 2013). 
 Three strikes and you’re out.  By the beginning of the 20th century, some states 
like Georgia already had laws designed to punish habitual offenders (Schultz, 2000).  In 
the early 20th century California and others passed similar laws that survived 
constitutional challenges, but by 1980 only three states still had habitual offender laws on 
the books (Schultz, 2000).  Early in the 1990s there was a significant movement 
nationally toward a crime control approach, and California was no different.  California’s 
was in part driven by the public’s perceptions for the need to address crime and career 
criminals (Zimring, et al, 2001).  Public perceptions about crime and highly publicized 
criminal acts in California by repeat offenders led to the modern iteration of the habitual 
offender law popularly called ‘three strikes and you’re out” (Ardaiz, 2000).  At the 
national level, Schultz (2000) found three strikes laws helped add to prison 
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overcrowding, disproportionately impacted minorities, and failed to have a substantive 
impact on violent crime.  In contrast, a study of Florida’s habitual offender law’s impact 
on crime rate did establish a relationship with harsher sentences and slight decreases in 
rape, robbery, larceny and vehicle theft (Kovandzic, 2001).  Examining the law’s impact 
in California just a few years after implementation, Shinbein (1996) and Vitello (1997) 
criticized inefficiencies and disparities brought about by three strikes, including its failure 
as a crime control measure.  Contrasted against Shinbein and Vitello were the findings of 
Ardaiz (2000), who examined a larger period of time and additional crime data and 
concluded three strikes could be credited with averting thousands of violent crimes 
through incapacitation of habitual criminals.  Ardaiz (2000) held that incarcerated 
offenders were incapable of victimizing people outside the walls of their institution.  
Finally, as if to strike a balance with two extremes, was a comprehensive 10 year review 
of California counties most and least likely to send three strikers to prison found only 
modest crime rate reductions for the stricter counties (Brown & Jolivette, 2005). 
More recent studies cast doubt on the law’s ability to keep communities safe, and 
address issues of disparate treatment and proportional punishment (Heyer, 2012).  This 
criticism was based on the law’s focus on the offense and not the offender, a shortcoming 
Heyer (2012) decries as ironic since three strikes was billed a way to punish offenders 
otherwise immune from correctional efforts.  
Three strikes and overcrowding.  As pertaining to overcrowding, many writers 
identify three strikes as a contributor to California’s prison overpopulation problem 
(Chen, 2008; Schultz, 2000; Heyer, 2012).  In addition, Walsh (2007) articulated an 
unintended consequence of the three strikes law that impacted local stakeholders: the 
displacement effect in local jails when three strikes candidates remained incarcerated 
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 while misdemeanants were released in greater numbers.  
In terms of legal challenges to three strikes, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Ewing noted that a majority of felons released from prison recidivate within three years 
even as they upheld three strike’s constitutionality (Ewing, 2003).  Since 1994, California 
voters have amended three strikes, eliminating, among others, simple drug possession  as 
a catalyst for a life term and re-defining serious felonies that qualify under the act 
(Walsh, 2007).   
 Other get-tough sentencing laws.  Few judicial actions have had such long-term 
effects on the make up the nature of this generation’s correctional population than 
mandatory and determinate prison sentencing (D’Elia, 2010).  The philosophy of 
mandatory prison sentences, or the attaching of specific and often lengthy sentences to 
specific offenses, grew in popularity at the federal and state level as judicial stakeholders 
ramped up their efforts on the war against drugs (Subramanian & Delaney 2014).  In 
California, the transition away from indeterminate sentencing eclipsed 60 years of 
previous juris prudence (Fazzi, 2013).  Despite concerns over the efficacy and fairness of 
mandatory sentences (Tonry, 2009), the adoption of mandatory sentencing for federal 
drug convictions in 1986 and the aforementioned three strikes law in California was not 
substantially reformed until this decade.  The United States Sentencing Commission was 
critical of mandatory sentencing’s impact on prison populations, and Congress made 
significant structural changes regarding mandatory sentences to the country’s drug laws 
in 2010 (Subramanian & Delaney 2014).  
 1994 also saw California undertake an amendment to the Welfare and Institutions 
Code to allow prosecutors authority try juveniles as adults, thereby facilitating their 
transfer from juvenile authorities to the state prison (WIC 707, 1994).  In 2000,  
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California voters overwhelmingly passed Proposition 21, which increased sentences for 
juvenile offenders and adults related to gang crimes and other serious felonies (Taylor, 
2002).  These and other get-tough approaches were often the result of a popular wave of 
concern over public safety.   
 Policy makers drove California’s sentencing laws and guidelines towards a crime 
control posture in other ways.  Governor Ronald Reagan signed California’s first version 
of a “use a gun, go to prison law” in 1969, a sentencing enhancing law later modified and 
given a new moniker, “use a gun and you’re done” (PC §12022.53, 2014).  The current 
law mandates a term of 10-20 years for the use of a firearm during the commission of 
certain felonies such a murder, rape, and robbery.  During Governor Edmund G. Brown 
Jr’s first term he signed California’s first determinate sentencing law, declaring that 
California’s penal system was in place to punish offenders (Dansky, 2008).  The law 
established specific sentence structures for state courts, leaving indeterminate sentencing 
only for crimes such as murder (Dansky, 2008).  Under the progressive political 
landscape of the time this law should kept sentences on the lower end of the spectrum.  
As Sacramento’s political outlook changed, however, legislators passed laws lengthening 
sentences, in many cases reducing the discretion of state judges (Dansky, 2008).  Finally, 
in 1988 California voters approved Proposition 80, an 817 million dollar bond designed 
to build prisons, jails, and youth detention facilities (Gilmore, 2007).  
 With the necessary legal and grey bar infrastructure in place, California was 
poised to lead the nation in placing its denizens in prison at rates previously unknown 
within the borders of the United States (Males, et al, 2006).  
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Racial and Economic Disparities 
The fact that American prisons were racially skewed against people of color and the 
disadvantaged is a matter of record, but determining why was more complex.  Pettit & 
Western, 2004, determined a male African-American high school dropout born in the late 
60’s had a 60% chance of being imprisoned, possibly related to declining urban wages, 
the culture of jail inevitability, and the crack epidemic.  Sutton (2013) examined 12 of 
California’s most populous counties and found that African-Americans faced much 
longer prison sentences as compared to similarly situated white persons.  Examining the 
impact of harsh sentence structures, Schlesinger (2011) hypothesized that a 
disproportionate number of crimes committed by people of color had mandatory sentence 
attachments, constituting a kind of colorblind racism.      
As a way to highlight the disparity of such sentencing philosophies on urbanized 
people of color, Schlesinger noted nearly 5% of all African-American men were 
incarcerated either in prison or jail (2011).  In California, Noll (2012) added dimension to 
the complexity of the issue by dissecting the impact of the CDCR’s policy of segregating 
prisoners along racial lines.  While the Supreme Court ruled the practice of separating the 
races in prison constitutionally valid if narrowly defined, Noll argued the necessity for 
racial segregation spoke to racial imbalances that permeate the nation’s largest 
correctional system (2012).  
Crime Reported in the United States 
Crime Reporting and Statistics 
 The Uniform Crime Report.  Criminal acts normally come to the attention of the 
police when victims or witnesses contact them.  Once information is gathered and police 
take a crime report, it is classified in one of several categories.  The close of the calendar  
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year signals to the thousands of law enforcement agencies in the country to forward data 
on reported crimes to the FBI for aggregation and analysis (Nolan, et al, 2011; FBI, 
2012).  This expansive accumulation of data is later disseminated publically as the 
Uniform Crime Report (UCR).  Collected since the 1920’s, UCR data is considered 
generally reliable, although concerns have been raised regarding errors in classification 
based on human error, especially regarding property crimes (Nolan, et al, 2011; FBI, 
2012).  Recognizing the varied and volatile nature of crime and crime reporting, federal 
authorities warn against using national crime data to rank the effectiveness of disparate 
police agencies or crime control strategies (FBI, 2012).  
The National Crime Victimization Survey.  The other well-established method 
to measure crime nationally has been the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), 
an instrument administered by the Census Bureau asking participants to report if they 
have recently been victims of crime (Lauritsen, et al, 2014).  Previous research has 
indicated a wide disparity in reports of victimization, as captured by the NCVS (O Brien, 
1996), and those reported to the police as captured in the UCR, although that gap appears 
to be narrowing (Catalano, 2006).  Cantor and Lynch (2000) were satisfied the national 
survey and UCR data tend to complement each other’s findings and discrepancies were 
less problematic.  More of concern to researchers is bias in reporting, wherein serious 
crimes were much more likely to be reported than less serious crimes, leading to these 
lesser crimes being understated in reports such as the UCR (Levitt, 1998).  Most 
researchers will account for this bias when they examine reported crime data.  
Crime reporting validity.  Questions may properly be raised about the accuracy 
and validity of data about which so many policy decisions were made and scholarly 
inferences drawn.  The quality and quantity of the public’s relationship with their local  
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law enforcement agency was a significant variable in how often victims report crime to 
the police (Levitt, 1998).  Avdija and Giever were among several researchers who found 
correlations between gender, socio-economic status, and race and reporting crime to the 
police (2012).  Property crime in particular was more likely to be reported when the 
socio-economic level of the victim was higher (Avdija & Giever, 2012).  Goudriaan 
(2006) argued in addition to socio-economic reasons, perceptions of police effectiveness 
and the nature of the victim’s neighborhood influence the frequency of reporting of crime 
to the police.  In contrast, Davis and Henderson (2003) found racial, ethnic, and socio-
economic factors were not as impactful as how connected and empowered victims within 
their communities.  
Social status, crime and crime reporting.  Merton’s (1938) foundational 
exploration on the causes of crime in the United States posited that such activity could be 
traced in part to an inexorable desire among Americans to improve their economic lot in 
life.  Merton (1938) also identified pressure upon those less affluent as they struggled to 
make economic headway; especially if society burdened them in ways the affluent were 
not.  Chambliss (2001) found a correlation between the lack of wealth and incarceration 
levels as well as disparities related to race and gender; the poor and persons of color were 
more likely to end up in prison.  
In the wake of the great recession that began seven years ago, it is illuminating to 
examine literature that accounts for the economic variables as they relate to crime since 
2007.  Writers on this subject have been challenged by the counter-intuitive nature of this 
great recession (Rosenfeld, 2013).  While researchers have often looked to bellwether 
indicators such as high unemployment or foreclosure rates that tended to auger in crime 
increases, Rosenfeld (2103) found crimes such as robbery or burglary fell significantly 
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 during the current recession.  Rosenfeld did find a relationship between wage levels and 
violence, especially among those 18-24 in age; persons in that age group whose wage 
levels were low, tended to be more likely to commit crimes of violence.  Wolff, et al, 
(2014) found no relationship between the substantial foreclosure rates that marked the 
current recession and crime rates.  Lauritsen, et al (2014), agreed little evidence for 
linkage between economic hardships resulting from the recent recession and significant 
increases in reported crime existed.  
Crime classifications.  The US Department of Justice defines eight crimes to be 
of greatest concern to policy makers, communities and researchers as Part 1 crimes; 
murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft and 
arson (BJS, 2009).  According to Douglas, et al, 2013, crimes may be characterized by 
their likely outcome such as murder, rape, and robbery; or the monetary, non-violent 
intent of the offender such as theft, fraud, and burglary.  The former group was popularly 
known as property crimes. 
As the present study seeks insight on realignment’s possible impact on property 
crimes, Becker’s (1968) historical yet impactful proposition that criminals often weigh 
the chances of punishment against the potential for financial gain is still relevant.  Davis’ 
(2006) economic model of crime expanded on the variables of loot and arrest probability 
by adding the importance of the agent’s crime environment:  the more attractive the 
neighborhood to operate the more likely the theft.  Thus the focus on property crime in 
this study as thousands of inmates convicted of property crimes offenses were realigned 
to community corrections. 
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Traditional Corrections 
Incapacitation  
Before realignment, California’s pervasive correctional philosophy was 
incapacitation (Bhati, 2007; Duker & Malsch, 2012).  The theory of incapacitation holds 
that appropriately sentenced offenders cannot commit crimes within the public sphere 
while they were locked up in prison or jail, thereby positively impacting public safety 
(Zimring & Hawkins, 1995; Males, et al, 2006).  While the effectiveness or even 
constitutionality of incapacitative policies has been questioned, it is clear the state’s focus 
on arrests and convictions resulted in more arrests and convictions (Bhati, 2007).  Wilson 
(2007), commented on the shortsightedness of incapacitation compared to rehabilitation, 
branded incapacitation incapable of “changing anything about people except where they 
are” (p.14).  Also, Rose and Clear (1998) pointed to the seemingly endless cycle of 
incarceration in some communities as destabilizing to families and social order groups 
which likely increased criminal behavior, not reduced it.  Finally, Johnson and Rafael 
(2012) found a 30% drop in the crime reduction capabilities of incarceration in the period 
between 1978-1990 compared to 1991-2004, showing a reduction in incapacitation’s 
effectiveness.   
California has been particularly effective in locking people up as compared to the 
other 49 states.  While the country’s incarceration rate increased 250% from 1980 to 
2010, California incarceration rate increased 365% for the same period (Sourcebook, 
2010).  As further evidence of this, Table 1 contains the abbreviated findings of Males, 
Macallair, and Corcoran (2006), outlining arrests and imprisonment rates for youth and 
adults in California since 1970, in five-year increments.  Table 1 contains clear evidence 
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crime control policies in the last three decades in California have resulted in more 
persons arrested and imprisoned.  
Table 1  
 
California Youth and Adult Rates of Arrest for Violent Crime and Imprisonment Rates, 
per 100,000 Population by Age, in Five-Year Increments 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Youth (ages 10-17)                      Adult (ages 18-69) 
Year     Violent crime     Imprisonment         Violent crime  Imprisonment 
    arrest rate          rate              arrest rate  rate 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1970      310.6        194.5             324.4   161.1 
1975      551.0        142.9             396.5   116.1 
1980      555.6        169.9             435.8  137.3 
1985      394.8        213.7            379.9  275.9 
1990      641.9       251.6            651.6  473.8 
1995      596.2      263.5            645.1  642.6 
2000      408.6      179.7            513.3  713.4 
2005          71.2    674.6 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
It appeared get-tough sentencing laws, as well as prison building, were 
dependable precursors to higher incarceration rates.  Judging efficacy of get-tough 
measures is harder to articulate, since many states enjoyed historic reductions in crime 
from 1993-2004, as shown in Table 2, adapted from Walsh’s comprehensive Three 
Strikes Laws (2007).  Walsh’s (2007) illustration depicts significant drops in violent and 
property crime during three strikes’ years of influence, but New York enjoyed the highest 
percentage drop in crime without the benefit of a California version of three strikes.  
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Table 2 
Crime rates of most populous states.  The rates are expressed as number of crimes per 
100,000 people.  The government excludes the murder and non-negligent homicides that 
occurred as a result of the events of September 11, 2001. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                 California                   Florida                    New York              Texas 
______________________________________________________________________ 
           Violent  Property      Violent  Property      Violent  Property       Violent  Property 
1993     1,078       5,379         1,206       7,415       1,074     4,478              762      5,677 
2004        552       3,419            711       4,180          442     2,199              541      4,494  
 
Percent 
Reduction     49         36             41           44                59        51                29           21 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Liedka, et al, (2006) rhetorically summarized the contrasting theories on the 
efficacy of incapacitation this way; does the massive increase of incapacitation through 
incarceration that began in the late 1980s covary with the drop in crime in the decades 
that followed?  Bhati (2007) examined offender tracking data from California to estimate 
each offender locked up in his mid-twenties prevented 24 crimes if imprisoned over a 
decade.  In contrast, Chambliss (2001), Zimring and Hawkins (1995) were among those 
who discounted the value of incapacitation, while Marvell and Moody (1996), Levitt 
(2004), were just as adamant in identifying a clear correlation between incapacitation and 
public safety.  Liedka, et al, (2006) argued their findings demonstrate the benefit of a 
synthesis of opposing literature on this issue.  They conceded the nation’s prison building 
and prison filling proclivity had the desired effect of reducing crime, but were also 
convinced the saturation point of “declining marginal returns” has been reached (Liedka, 
et al, 2006, p.272).  Lofstrom and Rafael (2013) concurred diminishing returns reduce the 
preventative benefit of incapacitation, but convincingly set the stage for monetarily 
quantifying the removal of criminals from society through incarceration.  Using previous 
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 extrapolations as well as their own findings, they estimated each realigned inmate in 
custody prevents 2.1 property crimes per year, on average (Lofstrom & Rafael, 2013).  
Acknowledging the public policy implications of arguing a cost benefit analysis of 
correctional strategies is attainable; Lofstrom and Rafael (2013) questioned what 
threshold of crime stakeholders were willing to tolerate.   
California Prison and Jail Overcrowding 
Many studies have tracked the steady increase in prison overcrowding as it 
mirrored crime control rhetoric and policies of the 70’s and 80’s.  Schlanger (2013) 
pointed to a get-tough philosophy following increased crime rates of the 1970’s as a 
proximate cause to state prison overcrowding.  At the end of the current millennium, 
California had a more populous prison system than the populations in Germany, England, 
France or the United Kingdom (Zimring, el al, 2001).  Salins and Simpson (2013) also 
pointed to California’s parole system, unique in the United States, in which inmates were 
regularly sent back to prison for technical violations, that in 2007 accounted for over half 
of inmates entering prison.  Like other prison systems, California had additional concerns 
caring for a rapidly aging population that complicated and added expense to prison 
operations (Simon, 2013).  Noll (2012) accounted for the substantial challenges in 
housing a population constantly in the midst of racially fueled gang warfare, forcing 
correctional staff to devise new ways to classify inmates so enemies were kept at 
distance, including racial segregation. 
California state prisons have instituted maximum-security facilities within the 
prisons to house inmates deemed to be a danger to other inmates and staff.  
Overcrowding in the state’s correctional facilities exacerbated the scale and nature of 
violence in prison.  Apart from a lack of adequate medical and mental health care, the  
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sheer number of inmates placed an inordinate amount of stress on corrections officers, as 
evidenced by inmate on inmate assaults and assaults on staff (Rappaport & Dansky, 
2010).  Haney (2003) established that inmates housed in these secure but isolated 
facilities developed a wide array of psychological dysfunctions, adding to the stress of 
inmates and for staff.  Awareness of overcrowding as a precursor to dangerous conditions 
for staff was present as early as 2006 (Specter, 2010).  The Little Hoover Commission 
(2007) reported that between 2003 and 2006, 1,700 claims were filed by CDCR staff 
following assaults by inmates.  
As California’s prison population levels were engendering an emergency 
proclamation from Governor Schwarzenegger, he acknowledged in late 2006 that prison 
overcrowding was causing overcrowding in county jails (Schwarzenegger, 2006).  The 
Governor’s proclamation noted over 200,000 prisoners avoided incarceration or were let 
out early, and 20 of 58 county jails were already laboring under court-mandated 
population caps (Schwarzenegger, 2006).  Previous to realignment, judges were also 
required to send some inmates to state facilities because of sentencing requirements, but 
also because of the dearth of community correction and treatment alternatives (Little 
Hoover Commission, 2007). 
Impact of local sentencing.  Ball (2012) argued that counties have only recently 
begun to bear the weight of their own sentencing decisions.  Since counties empanel the 
juries, elect the judges and prosecutors, and appoint probation and police chiefs, they had 
the freedom to get-tough at the state’s expense regardless of the impact on the state as a 
whole (Ball, 2012).  In arguing for a data-driven approach to violent crime sentencing, 
Ball believed a distinction between “crime-justified incarceration and policy-driven 
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 incarceration” was required to assure effective use of resources while maintaining public 
safety (Ball, 2012, p.1001). 
The following figure shows California state prison populations from 2003-2013 as 
gathered by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR).  The figure 
illustrates the height of population at 173, 312 in 2007 to its decade low of 135, 238.  The 
CDCR also projects modest increases for 2014 and 2015 to 137,935. 
 
Figure 1.  The total prison population within state facilities as captured by the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Numbers are for 2003-2013. Adapted 
from “Institutional Population Trends, Actual and Projected” retrieved from 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult_Research_Branch/Research_Documents/Spring-2014-
Population-Projections-Publication_06092014.pdf 
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Figure 1. California Total Prison Population 2004-2013
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 Near the height of overpopulation, drug and property crime offenses accounted for 
37% of offenders housed in prison, or over 62,000 inmates (Little Hoover Commission, 
2007).  This dynamic would later become a key focus of realignment’s tenet that non-
violent, non-serious offender serve their time in community corrections.  
Impact on county jails.  In California, each of the 58 counties has an elected 
sheriff, the official in the county responsible for maintaining a county jail.  As county 
sheriffs faced an increase in inmates in their jails, many responded by affording early 
releases to their charges.  Hill, et al, (2013) examined the trends in most California jail 
bookings for the BSCC and their findings reveal the impact of realigning the care of 
inmates from state to county facilities.  In the nearly two years since implementation, the 
average daily population of jails in the study increased from 72,285 in October 2011 to 
82,705 in September of 2013 (Hill, et al, 2013).  Since realignment was designed to 
transfer the care of inmates sentenced for low level felonies as well as the advent of split 
sentencing, this was expected.  A majority of this difference not surprisingly, were 
sentenced inmates; by a ratio of nearly six to one (Hill, et al, 2013).  Their data also 
indicated misdemeanants were being released early, supported by findings showing a 
15% and 68% increase in non-sentenced and sentenced inmate early releases due to lack 
of housing capacity (Hill, et al, 2013).  Fortunately, Hill, et al, (2013) found that assaults 
on jail staff saw significant decreased in assaults since realignment’s implementation.  
As this study transitions from corrections to policing, it is instructive to note 
Nagin’s (2013) summary of the interplay of some of these critical criminal justices 
forces.  Alluding to the role of effective policing, Nagin believed the certainty of being  
caught was more a deterrent than the punishment itself (2013).  Also implicating the 
effectiveness of policing strategies was Nagin’s argument that law enforcement deters 
    
 
 
 
 
39 
 
crime by convincing criminals they will likely be caught, an idea that sets the stage for an 
examination of the literature on police resourcing and tactics.  
Forces Influencing Police Staffing 
Impact of the Great Recession on California Municipalities  
The national recession which began in 2007 has ushered in what Kiewiet and 
McCubbins called the “New Fiscal Ice Age,” where “a given level of state and local tax 
revenue purchases a considerably lower level of current services” (2014, p.106).  
Leachman, et al, also reported on the trend by the federal government to slough off 
funding for social programs that now had to borne by states and local authorities (2011).  
The recession has contributed to the loss of local tax revenue, directly impacting the 
money municipalities use to pay for services, at the same time money from their state 
capitols and Washington has been significantly reduced (Pew, 2012).  This same study 
found California state and local governments reduced over 100,000 public sector 
positions since 2007.  Indeed, California has been labeled the “fountainhead” of the 
recession, with its immense nationwide influence and over 1 million jobs lost between 
2007 and 2009 (Bardham & Walker, 2011).  
 Many California cities, struggling to recover from the recession, were dealt an 
equally debilitating blow with the dissolution of the Redevelopment Agency (RDA) by 
Governor Brown in 2012 (Davidson & Ward, 2014).  California cities were forced to pay 
billions back to the state, laying off thousands of employees previously compensated at 
least in part through RDA proceeds (Davidson & Ward, 2014).  
 Another area impacting city budgets was employee benefits.  Most California 
cities with municipal police departments partnered with the California Public Employee 
Retirement System (CALPERS) to pay for post-employment retirement benefits. 
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CALPERS payments were calculated based actuarial methodologies and the investment 
policy of the CAPERS Board of Directors.  Due to the recession and changes in 
investment assumptions by CALPERS, cities’ payments into the system have greatly 
increased, from slightly less than $500 million annually in 2000 to $7 billion in 2010 
(Kilgour, 2011).  In response to these and other fiscal pressures, many government 
agencies have reverted to austerity measures, a “hollowing out” process that dramatically 
reduced personnel and services to the public (Warner & Clifton, 2014, p.46).  
 Specifically addressing how policing has been impacted by recessionary forces, 
the Federal Office of Community Oriented Policing’s expansive 2011 report documented 
the steady rise of sworn police in the US until 2008 and the drastic reductions in 
succeeding years, including about 10,000 officers laid off nationally.   
Size of the Police Force 
If uniformed police officers are easily recognizable, their individual and collective 
value in their communities as crime fighters (deterrence) were grounds for some debate.  
Chief among these was the size of the force, but also of concern was their heavy footprint 
on a cities’ budget and the effectiveness of the strategies they employ.  D'Alessio and 
Stolzenberg (1998) helpfully outlined three competing theories in this area where the role 
and size of a police force has an impact; deterrence, crime-punishment, and 
incapacitation.  Incapacitation having been addressed above, deterrence refers to the 
ability of the police to deter criminal activity, and crime-punishment suggest criminals 
may avoid criminality if effective punishment was assured (Becker, 1968; D'Alessio & 
Stolzenberg, 1998).  Influences driving the size of a police department’s sworn workforce 
has not been abundantly studied, especially as it relates to smaller cities.  Examining the 
reason for the size of police forces in larger American cities has led writers to 
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 hypothesize the size of police forces were driven by a “social-control phenomenon” 
engineered to control minority groups (Sharp, 2006, p.305; Garland, 2001).  Sharp’s 
(2006) analysis named variables affecting the size of the force such as legacy staffing 
issues, the financial health of a city, and social control needs following civil disturbances.   
As to how effectively police fulfill their role as crime fighters, Marvell and 
Moody (1996) contributed significantly to the understanding of how police staffing 
impact crime.  They effectively synthesized arguments for and against the theories of 
causality: does crime impact the police or do police impact crime (Marvell & Moody, 
1996)?  They examined 36 studies and found strong evidence more police did not always 
reduce crime but that but higher crime resulted in more police (Marvell & Moody, 1996).  
Analyzing 20 years of UCR data and police staffing ending in 1992 for 49 states and over 
50 cities, estimated police staffing levels do have a significant impact on most urban 
crimes (Marvell & Moody, 1996).  More recently, doubts have arisen about the efficacy 
of attributing crime drops to specific policing strategies, couched as they were within a 
broader sociological construct including, among other variables, race and economics 
(Blumstein and Wallman, 2006). 
Levitt (2004) also argued increasing police officers was one of four factors 
responsible for historic crime reductions of the 1990’s, along with the increased rate of 
incarceration (incapacitation), the shrinking crack epidemic and the increased abortion 
rate.  Interestingly, in the same study, Levitt discounted widely used policing strategy 
initiatives such as COMPSTAT as having a positive effect on crime rates.  Eck and 
Maguire’s (2006) reviewed similar data and questioned the ability to measure police 
force size and crime rates since both sometimes increase simultaneously, effectively 
mirroring each other.  Chalfin (2013) used 50 years of crime data and police force sizes 
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 of 252 cities to quantify police effectiveness thusly: a dollar spent on hiring a police 
officer resulted in $1.60 savings in cost of reduced victimization.  Levitt (1998) estimated 
one officer added to the force accounts for five additional crimes reported to the police 
annually. 
 Police funding.  Critical to the current analysis of police staffing was 
acknowledging the impact of President Bill Clinton and the 103rd Congress’ foray into 
law enforcement hiring, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.  A 
major goal of this bill was the hiring of 100,000 new officers nationwide through 
competitive grants (USGPO, 1993).  Some 65,000 were hired by 2005 (Evans and 
Owens, 2007).  Zhao and Thurman (2004) identified a reduction in crime thanks to grant-
funded hires in cities with populations larger than 10,000.  Worrall and Kovandzic (2010) 
examined data from 1990-2001 and found a correlation between the addition of federally 
funded officers and a reduction in serious crimes in larger US cities.  Evans and Owens 
(2007) also saw drops in burglaries, vehicle thefts, robberies, and assaults in the years 
following the hiring of federally subsidized officers.  In contrast, Mulhausen (2001) held 
that particularly as to violent crime, there was not a statistically measurable effect after 
the federal government subsiding hiring of local law enforcement officers.  
Police staffing.  The net effect on crime by this national hiring incentive aside, 
most local law enforcement agencies were impacted by issues closer to home when 
staffing issues were examined.  Wilson and Weiss (2014) studied the staffing practices of 
20 police agencies nationwide, including some under duress from the current recession 
and analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of methods employed such as per-capita, 
minimum staffing, and workload-based methods.  While acknowledging the challenges of 
staffing related to recruitment and retention, they concluded that some police agencies 
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 lack an evidence-based method to determine appropriate staffing levels (Wilson & 
Weiss, 2014).  In terms of trends in California, the cumulative statistics on staffing 
provided by the state’s agencies to the attorney general were instructive. 
Data in Table 3 was from the state’s attorney general’s Criminal Justice Statistics 
Center (CJSC) website and shows the difference in staffing for four major categories of 
California sworn law enforcement from 2007, at the outset of the recession, and 2012, the 
latest year for which figures were available (CJSC, 2014).  The total law enforcement 
number includes prosecutors, defense attorneys, their investigators and non-sworn 
professional staff and was provided for reference in the final row. 
Table 3 
A total of all sworn and non-sworn law enforcement staffing from 2007-2012, as reported 
to the attorney general 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Category                                 2007               2012             Percentage Change 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Municipal Police             55,941              51,376                      -8.16 
 
Sheriff’s Deputies             51,021              51,384 .71 
 
Highway Patrol              7,469                 7,418 -.66 
 
Probation Officers               9,891              13,110 31.34 
 
Total Law Enforcement         155,503           149,353 -3.95 
 
 
 Finally, although the weight science gives to increasing the number of officers as 
a crime reduction force has been examined, research into the loss of officer positions has 
not been examined as fully.  The Rand Corporation examined the cost attributed to 
subtracting police and found robust evidence that the loss of officers, in this case 12% of  
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Toledo, Ohio’s contingent in 2009, extrapolated to 32 million in losses and 428 
additional crimes in one year (Heaton, 2010). 
Effectiveness of policing strategies.  The ability of police forces to prevent crime 
or arrest violators were often the product of the strategies implemented to that end.  An 
early but influential examination of policing strategies comes from Wilson and Boland 
(1978) who emphatically support the notion that aggressive policing can reduce crime 
and victimization.  Wilson and his colleague Kelling (1982) first coined the term “broken 
windows” to describe neglected neighborhoods becoming crime havens, and presumably 
whose fortunes could be altered by intervention, especially but not exclusively involving 
law enforcement.  Evidence shows directed police activity has an effect on crime in the 
area being targeted, expressed as either “displacement” or “diffusion” (Weisburd &Telep, 
2014).  Displacement refers to crime simply being pushed elsewhere, not an altogether 
positive result, or the more desirable diffusion as crime was reduced as police focus on 
hot spots (Weisburd & Telep, 2014).  Further evidence that the mere presence of officers 
had positive outcomes was presented by Di Tella, & Schargrodsky (2004), who 
documented decreases in auto theft, among other crimes, when officers flooded 
neighborhoods in which there were synagogues following an anti-Semitic terror attack in 
Argentina in 1994.  
How well police deter crime was difficult to gauge, with some writers holding 
that a robust police presence deters crime, while others believed this presence only 
displaces crime. Even when displacement occurs, Telep and Weisburd (2012) believed 
this was not necessarily negative, since some criminal activity was focused on a 
particular place because of its value to the criminal; displacement may mean elimination. 
A more aggressive police force targeting known problem areas may lead to arrests and 
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lower crime, but may lead to charges of racial profiling and its accompanying loss of trust 
and litigation directed at perceived rights violations (Withrow & Dailey, 2012).  
Arrests were one way to measure work done by police, and these data often 
correlate with the number of officers in service.  Table 4 captures arrests statewide for 
misdemeanor and felony offences from 2007 to 2012, the latest year these data were 
available to the attorney general (CJSC, 2014).  This table suggests there were nearly 
300,000 fewer arrests made in 2012 than in 2007. 
Table 4  
Felony and misdemeanor arrests made throughout the state of California as reported to 
the attorney general from 2007-2012.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year                     2007          2008      2009            2010           2011              2012 
Misdemeanor    992,588     1,010,038    970,221      918,279      825,455         792,297 
Felony               523,276     499,628       466,441      448,552      419,914         429,807  
________________________________________________________________________  
California Prison Reform  
 As prison reform did not solely originate with AB 109, the following is a partial 
list of reform drivers that set the stage for realignment and its progeny. 
Little Hoover Commission 
Created early in the 1960s through legislative fiat, the Little Hoover Commission 
has served as a bipartisan oversight of various governmental efforts including prison 
reform (D’Elia, 2010).  The Commission’s 2007 warning to California policy makers 
about reforming the state’s correctional system was illustrative of the complicated 
process that led to AB 109.  At that time the Commission partnered with the Stanford 
Law Center to address the looming issue of prison overcrowding.  The report’s title 
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served to alert readers as to the Commission’s findings without going past the title page: 
“Solving California’s Corrections Crisis: Time is Running Out.”  The report issued by the 
Commission (2007), replete with words like, “crisis”, “disaster”, and “tailspin” (p.ii), was 
not made in a vacuum.  Predating the Commission’s report by four months Governor 
Schwarzenegger (2006) issued a formal state of emergency related to overcrowding, 
convening the legislature in emergency session.  The governor’s declarations outlined the 
state’s deficiencies and ordered the CDCR to, among other items, investigate outsourcing 
living space for current inmates and transferring inmates outside the state 
(Schwarzenegger, 2006). 
The Commission’s efforts not only listed deficiencies but proposed solutions, 
challenging Governor Schwarzenegger and the legislature that “to ensure public safety, 
reforms will have to jettison posturing to make room for smart on crime policies” (Little 
Hoover Commission, 2007, cover letter).  As it turns out, the impetus to substantially 
reform California’s prison system was left to the courts, and reform addressing the 
Commission’s findings did not come until late 2011.  
Impacting overcrowding directly was the sentencing structure then in place, 
which according to the Commission (2007) forced judges to sentence certain inmates to 
the least cost effective method available to them-state prison.  In 2007 dollars, this meant 
each inmate housed by the state cost $37,000 annually (Little Hoover Commission, 
2007).  The Commission’s findings were broadly summarized as follows: 
1. Implement a comprehensive strategy to reduce prison overcrowding and improve 
public safety 
2. Implement evidence-based policies to reduce overcrowding and hold offenders 
accountable for improving themselves 
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3. Establish a sentencing commission to guide the state’s criminal justice sentencing 
policies to enhance public safety 
Thus the Commission (2007) foreshadowed the essence of realignment by directly 
addressing the transfer of responsibility from the state to counties:  
The state should reallocate resources to assist communities in expanding 
community-based punishment options for offenders who violate the terms 
of post-release supervision.  Working with communities, the state should 
reallocate resources to establish a continuum of alternatives to prison, 
including electronic monitoring, day reporting centers, drug treatment, jail 
time and other community-based sanctions. (p.v)  
A dissenting voice.  The Commission’s call for reform was not unanimous; a 
member of the state assembly, Audra Strickland, pointed out that the incapacitative 
nature of California’s existing system could be at least partially credited with lowering 
crime rates, and criticized the Commission for defining effectiveness on recidivism rates, 
not public safety (Little Hoover Commission, 2007). 
More recent Commission findings.  In late 2011, just before implementation of 
realignment, the Commission sent a letter to Governor Brown urging the transfer of 
responsibility for inmates to community corrections be properly resourced to avoid 
potential public safety concerns.  The Commission pointed out that leaving community 
correction alternatives unfunded or subject to the vagaries of annual budget fights could 
endanger the public and offenders as well, since realignment funding was not 
constitutionally protected like school funding (Little Hoover Commission, 2011).  
 As late as 2013, the Commission asked the Governor and legislature to revisit 
funding infrastructure of realignment, since financial oversight and reporting were not 
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part of the law and the efficacy of the 2 billion already spent was not known (Little 
Hoover Commission, 2013). 
SB 18 Non Revocable Parole 
In 2010, the California Senate passed and Governor Schwarzenegger signed 
Senate Bill 18, reforming the state’s parole rules.  Prior to SB 18, an inmate out on parole 
in California could be found in technical violation of parole for such things as leaving 
their home county without permission, associating with known felons, or testing positive 
for drugs (Special Report, 2011).  These violations brought to the attention of the Parole 
Board could result in a new prison term of up to six months for violation of parole 
(Special Report, 2011).  SB 18 changed this status quo.  In addition, SB 18 tasked the 
CDCR with evaluating parolees through the use of a validated risk assessment tool, and 
those inmates found to be at low risk were designated Non Revocable Parolees (NRP).  A 
NRP parolee could not be reinterred in the state prison solely for a technical violation of 
their parole terms, like leaving his/her home county, and was not under traditional 
supervision. An NRP inmate could only return to state prison upon a conviction for a new 
felony offense (CDCR, 2014).  Unfortunately, mistakes in assessing and assigning risk 
led to inmates being released that the state later deemed dangerous, and hundreds of 
inmates were recalled into custody (Special Report, 2011).  The state inspector general’s 
report on the matter (Special Report, 2011) advised between 1,000 and 2,000 inmates 
were released from custody under SB 18 who should not have been.  
Efficacy of Prison and Corrections Reform Efforts 
Realignment was not the first time California has enacted a program to subsidize 
communities to take over responsibility in supervising convicted felons.  In 1965, 
California adopted the Probation Subsidy Act, which paid counties to supervise inmates 
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 locally instead of being housed by the state, resulting in a 30% reduction of inmate 
population and the closure of eight prisons (Warren, 2009; Rashford, 2012).  When the 
Act became the target of those who thought inmates prematurely released from prison 
constituted a public safety threat, funding from the state was eliminated, county probation 
departments became dependent on irregular local funding, and more inmates found their 
way back to state facilities (Warren, 2009).  A lack of realistic funding coupled with 
displaced prisoners doomed the Act, since sheriffs connected these two aspects with an 
increase in crime (Misczynski, 2011).   
By 1995, the United States surpassed other Western industrialized countries as 
having the highest rates of incarceration per capita (Chambliss, 2001).  Zimring and 
Hawkins (1991) opined that California counties enjoyed a “free lunch” at the expense of 
the state; local juries, prosecutors, and probation officials arresting, convicting and 
sentencing inmates to state prison for crimes committed locally.  Their findings suggested 
since counties elected sheriffs, prosecutors, and judges, and impaneled juries that 
reflected the values of the community, conservative get-tough counties unfairly burdened 
the rest of the state (Zimring & Hawkins, 1991).  Ball (2012), built on this theory and 
analyzed the disparity within two similarly situated California counties, Riverside and 
Alameda.  Ball (2012) argued that these two counties convicted and sentenced inmates at 
vastly disparate rates to the state prison system, Riverside more so than Alameda.  Ball 
(2012) used these two counties because of their consistent track record of either a 
progressive or conservative constituency.  Since Riverside was tougher on crime, and 
sent many more inmates to the state facilities than Alameda, Riverside enjoyed a greater 
share of the benefits of the state penal system than its sister county (Ball, 2012). 
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In terms of cost efficiency, the net effect of housing a prisoner in a California 
prison grew from $37,000 annually in 2007 (Little Hoover Commission) to $48,500 
annually in 2012, or compared to the national average of $26,000, a difference of 87% 
(Heyer, 2012).  Prisoners with special needs due to health complications and those over 
the age of 55 were even more expensive, even with the 2 billion dollars spent annually on 
inmate health care (Heyer, 2012).  
SB 678 and SB x318 
State Senate bills 678 and x318 were efforts to reform probation and parole 
programs, respectively.  SB 678 was designed to monetarily incentivize probation 
departments and place offenders in programs with strong evidence of successfully 
reducing recidivism (Warren, 2009).  SB x318 passed as court challenges the state’s 
status quo reached its apex, required state parole to use a validated risk assessment to 
identify inmates risk to re-offend (Petersilia, 2009).  Similar to Non Revocable Parole, 
inmates deemed low risk would face no active supervision or be subject to technical 
violation and a return trip to state custody (Petersilia, 2009).   
Coleman, Plata and the Courts 
Coleman.  In 1990, Ralph Coleman, an inmate in Pelican Bay State Prison 
suffering mental health issues, claimed he was unable to receive appropriate and timely 
treatment.  Coleman sued the state in district court, alleging he and other similarly 
afflicted inmates were denied proper care and eventually prevailed in 1995 (Coleman, 
1995).  The court’s findings on Coleman did not address the issue of overcrowding, but 
Coleman prevailed on a claim of “insufficiency of service” (Coleman, 1995, p. 1307).  
The court was swayed by pervasive evidence of state neglect; the one and only doctor 
assigned to Coleman’s prison could not tell the court how many prisoners were under his 
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care (Coleman, 1995).  The court imposed a special master to oversee ordered remedies, 
but 12 years later the situation had reached crisis levels (Flynn, 2013).  
Plata.  In response to the threat of reformers challenging the government on 
overcrowding issues, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA). 
The Act made it harder for plaintiffs challenging prison conditions nationwide as it 
removed the ability of a single federal judge to mandate prison population reductions in 
favor of a three-judge panel (Schlanger, 2013).  Despite this uphill battle an inmate 
named Marciano Plata brought a suit against the state in 2001, alleging California’s 
corrections establishment was incapable of providing even basic medical treatment to 
inmates (Plata, 2005).  By 2007, the class action suits brought by Coleman and Plata 
were joined and were heard together by a three-judge panel of 9th Circuit Court judges 
(Flynn, 2013).  
Despite the difficulties PLRA placed on plaintiffs like Coleman and Plata, once 
empaneled, the judges reviewing conditions in California pulled no punches in declaring 
the state’s ability to provide appropriate medical services to prisoners as “broken beyond 
repair” (Plata, 2005, p.1).  Judge Thelton Henderson, in particular, noted the CDCR was 
incapable of reducing prison populations to acceptable levels independently, a condition 
which demanded direct intervention by the courts into an activity properly overseen by 
the executive branch (Plata, 2005).  The panel worked through an appointed receiver to 
establish the actual percentage the state would be allowed to house over its capacity.  One 
court appointed receiver, Robert Sillen, reported to the panel and the Little Hoover 
Commission that the CDCR’s inability to accomplish this task was partially a product of 
the dysfunctional culture within the CDCR as well as the state Departments of Finance 
and Human Resources (2006). 
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The three-judge panel.  The central point decided by the three-judge panel was 
the percentage of overpopulation that California could maintain while not violating the 
Eighth Amendment.  That number was set at 137.5% over capacity, or 110,000 inmates, 
to be accomplished by mid-2013 (Pennypacker & Thompson, 2013).  Since California 
had tens of thousands of inmates over the 137.5% envisioned by the courts, the state had 
to find ways to reduce its population forthwith.  The panel’s blueprint to reduce 
population was challenged by the state before the U.S. Supreme Court, which upheld the 
panel’s decision in late 2010; the final nail on the coffin for the status quo (Flynn, 2013).  
Table 5, adapted from a report from California’s Legislative Analyst Office 
(Taylor, 2012), shows the population numbers that should have existed within CDCR for 
the state to comply with the order of the three-judge panel.  
Table 5 
 
Estimated Inmate Population Reductions to Meet Federal Court Ruling. 
________________________________________________________________________
Court Imposed       Design                  Population       Population 
Deadline Capacity Limit                  Limit Limit 
________________________________________________________________________ 
December 27, 2011         167.0%                 133,000 11,000 
June 27, 2012         155.0                 123,000 10,000 
December 27, 2012         147.0                 117,000 6,000 
June 27, 2013         137.5                 110,000 7,000 
Two Year Total    34,000 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Relative to the pre-realignment September 28, 2011 population of 144,138 inmates. 
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 By July 2013, thanks in large measure to realignment, the state had reached a 
recent low point in population, but still over the court-ordered maximum, and numbers of 
inmates actually started to creep up (Pennypacker & Thompson, 2013).   
AB 109 Legislation and Implementation 
 The California legislature passed AB 109 in the spring and it became effective 
October 1, 2011.  Despite the inexorable movement towards reform outlined above, 
realignment was championed by a single political party and moved expeditiously through 
the legislature without the benefit of traditional hearings (Rushford, 2012).  The 
following is a review of the literature revolving its implementation and impact among 
justice stakeholders.  
 Components of realignment.  Realignment was designed to shift the 
responsibility for certain convicted felons to the state’s 58 counties.  Fazzi (2013) 
outlined the components of the law that impacted county sheriff and probation 
departments: 
1. Counties exercise complete control over "low-level" felons:  non-violent, non-
serious, and non-sexual, and who also has no prior convictions for any serious, violent, or 
sexual crime 
2.    Counties supervise "mid-level" felons upon release from prison: not low-level 
but whose commitment offense is neither serious nor violent is a "mid-level" felon.   
3.    Counties incarcerate "high-level" felons who violate their parole conditions: 
a felon whose commitment offense is a serious or violent felony or a third strike offense, 
or who is a high-risk sex offender or possesses a mental disorder, and found to have 
violated parole terms. 
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With these three categories of felons being made the responsibility of the 
counties, funding to pay for jail space, training, treatment, and supervision became a 
matter of high consequence to county officials (Pennypacker & Thompson, 2013). 
 AB 109 funding mechanism.  Funding for realignment was to substantively 
come from a small portion of the sales tax and vehicle license fees; to be forwarded 
directly the 58 counties to assist them in paying for infrastructure, personnel, and 
programs (Misczynski, 2011).  This funding stream was clearly insufficient, and further 
funding would require impetus from the governor and approval by the legislature, thus 
making it a potential annual political football to be negotiated by those actors 
(Misczynski, 2011).  Unlike funding for schools, there was no constitutionally protected 
funding stream for realignment (Little Hoover Commission, 2011).  More recently, 
passage of Proposition 30 by the voters has stabilized taxes rates which in turn secured a 
portion of realignment’s future funding (Flynn, 2013).  Counties received $450 million, 
$850 million, and 1 billion in the first three fiscal years of implementation, respectively 
(Flynn, 2013).  On the state’s side of the ledger, realignment constituted immense 
savings; with reductions in inmates housed and supervised, California was projected to 
save an estimated 1.7 billion in fiscal 2014-2015 (Taylor, 2012).  
Counties used the little-known Community Corrections Partnerships (CCPs), 
formed under AB 678, consisting of seven executive members: the chief probation officer 
as chair, the sheriff, the district attorney, the public defender, the presiding judge of the 
superior court, one representative from either the department of social services or mental 
health, and a single police chief (BSCC, 2014).  In essence, the CCPs served as the policy 
making and budget approving body for each of the 58 counties as to realignment monies.  
Deciding what priorities would be addressed became the first focus, precisely as 
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 realignment intended: empowering officials at the lowest level of government and 
closest to the needs of the community.  The result of a survey of CCPs by the BSCC at 
Table 6 was illustrative of priorities in the early stages of realignment implementation 
(BSCC, 2014).  
Table 6 
Results of a BSCC 2013 survey of each CCP to rank the local priority areas for FY 2011-
12, 2012-13 and 2013-14, items ranked 1-9, most important being 1. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Fiscal Year             Fiscal Year  Fiscal Year 
2011-2012              2012-2013  2013-2014 
 
1. Staffing                                   1. Staffing   1. Staffing 
2. Health                   2. Health  2. Health  
3. Risk Assessment                 3. Day Reporting                              3. Day Reporting 
4. Staff Training                 4. Data  4. Data  
5. GPS                        5. Risk Assessment (tie)  5. Risk Assessment 
6. Day Reporting                 5. Staff Training (tie)                         6. GPS 
7. Data                 7. GPS   7. Staff Training 
8. Law Enforcement                  8. Medical   8. Medical 
9. Medical                         9. Law Enforcement  9. Law Enforcement 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Recidivism.  Defining and exploring recidivism was key to the measurement of 
realignment’s success or shortcomings.  Merely defining recidivism was complicated by 
the varied definitions within the literature (Jancic, 1998), and sensitivity among 
stakeholders with the advent the realignment (Tafoya, et al, 2014).  Beck (2001) 
explained recidivism was also defined differently based on organizational needs or roles 
that can vary between diverse but related stakeholders such the police and drug treatment 
professionals.  In California, with its unique parole model in place previous to 
realignment, reform efforts to reduce the staggering effect of unchecked recidivism took 
the form of the Preventing Parolee Crime Program.  Under this program, early results 
showed some promise, Zhang, (et al, 2006) finding that engaged participants were at 
    
 
 
 
 
56 
 
reduced risk of incarceration.  To illustrate the difficulty in addressing underlying causes 
of recidivism an analysis of  therapeutic communities within prison just three years later 
by same researcher found no difference in reducing re-incarceration (Zhang, et al, 2009).  
Realigned probationers showed a reduced proclivity to recidivate (Pennypacker & 
Thompson, 2013), but also a third of these inmates had active warrants for violation of 
their probation terms.  Despite these challenges, Petersilia (2011) acknowledged some 
people belong in prison, but wrote convincingly that penal policy should not add to the 
problem by ignoring rehabilitative efforts that show solid evidence of lasting success. 
CDCR defined recidivism “by tracking arrests, convictions, and returns to State 
prison”, but primarily by returns to state prison, since this was the foci of the correctional 
mission (CDCRa, 2013, p.iv).  Even before realignment, CDCR documented a reduction 
in three-year recidivism rates from a high of 67.5% in 2005-2006 to 61% in 2008-2009 
(CDCRa, 2013).  As alluded to earlier, stakeholders such as California’s Bureau of State 
Community Corrections (BSCC) and the state’s current Attorney General Kamala Harris’ 
definition of recidivism was at odds on an important point. The BSCC’s definition 
focused on a new conviction within three years of release from prison, while General 
Harris holds a new arrest and filing of charges defined recidivism (BSCC, 2014a; Harris, 
2014).  The difference was significant since recidivism was a primary metric to determine 
an inmate’s ability to reintegrate into society, and an arrest did not always result in a 
conviction (Weisburg, 2014).   Another difference was recidivism’s more stringent 
definition could color how the effectiveness of realignment was judged.   
Effects on justice system stakeholders.  Salins and Simpson (2013) pointed to 
the likelihood that realignment had only shifted California’s overcrowding from prison to 
county jails, a view echoed by the Little Hoover Commission (2013).  The net impact of  
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realignment by mid-2012 was that 207,000 felons within the state of California still be 
fall under the traditional correctional model in housing and parole due to the violent or 
serious nature of their offenses, and some 46,000 would be housed and supervised locally 
(Males and Buchen, 2013).  Many of state’s 480 jails were small facilities within police 
departments, and with one-third of counties already under court orders to fix 
overcrowding, new inmates would most certainly lead to early releases (Fazzi, 2013).  
County probation departments, overwhelmed with their new responsibilities, “lack the 
necessary information to make the best service and sanctioning decisions”, in part due to 
their information gathering and sharing limitations (Tafoya, et al, 2013, p.19).  
Impact of realignment.  Two studies that emerged in early 2013 analyzed 2012 
crime data for 67 California cities, the first full year subsequent to realignment’s 
implementation.  Scheidegger (2013) made the connection between realignment and the 
state’s increases in crime, which he labeled “California crime spike, particularly in the 
face the national crime trends.  The nation violent crime rate rose 1.2% and California 
cities rose 2.9%, and as for property crime, the nation enjoyed a .8% drop while 
California cities rose 9.7% (Scheidegger, 2013).  
Males and Buchen (2013) acknowledged the increase of crime in 2012 and 
focused on the counties as well as cities, at least in terms of realignment prisoners that 
resided in those counties.  By analyzing the state’s 21 most populous counties and the 
percentage of realigned offenders they housed, they argued counties with a higher 
percentage of realigned offenders should have reported higher increases in violent crime.  
The ten high-realignment counties managed 22.5% of their offenders locally while the 11 
low-realignment counties managed 15.5% of their offenders locally.  While both groups 
reported increases in crime, the ten high realignment counties actually had lower violent  
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and property crime rates than the 11 low realignment counties (Males & Buchen, 2013).  
These findings led the writers to believe realignment could not be blamed for an increase 
in crime, although neither study examined smaller, poorer jurisdictions. 
Lofstrom and Raphael (2013) of the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) 
stated unequivocally that robust evidence exited that realignment had an impact in the 
7.5% statewide increase in property crime, but were unconvinced the 18,000 additional 
felons on California streets moved the dial on violent crime.  They also compared the 
7.5% increase in property crime to the national drop in property crime as strong evidence 
realignment played a part (Lofstrom & Rafael, 2013).  They reasoned since realigned 
inmates and others displaced by realigned inmates were designated as such because of 
their propensity to commit low-level or property crime, an increase in these crimes could 
be anticipated.  In stark contrast, Males and Goldstein (2014) found no conclusive 
evidence of a connection between crime and post-realignment California, and specifically 
discounted findings by the PPIC of a causal connection between realignment and 
property crimes such as motor vehicle theft.  Males and Goldstein maintained that if 
realignment was connected to an increase in crime, those counties with a higher 
percentage of realigned prisoners in their midst would see greater increases; something 
their study did not support (Males & Goldstein, 2014).    
Other outcomes.  Split sentencing, one of realignment’s most unique aspects, 
was found to be unevenly distributed in the counties in early examination (Pennypacker 
& Thompson, 2013).  As an example, Stanislaus County assigned 86% of its inmates to 
split sentences, while Los Angeles County sentenced only 6% of its inmates to jail and 
supervision, leading Pennypacker and Thompson (2013) to believe some inmates were 
missing out on opportunities to receive help from post-release programming.  Another 
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 unintended consequence of realignment; the drop in population of the state run fire 
camps, low level inmates enlisted to help suppress fires were reduced, forced the state to 
hire federal firefighters at a much higher cost (Taylor, 2012).  
Conclusions 
 The literature examined above has provided evidence that California’s embrace of 
an incapacitative approach to crime to include three strikes resulted in increasing rates of 
incarceration not supported by the resources for housing and managing 170,000 inmates.  
These levels of incarceration without sufficient supporting infrastructure of housing, 
medical, and psychological care resulted in deficiencies that reached crisis levels.  The 
status quo proved unacceptable by the courts who were asked to square existing 
conditions in California’s prisons with constitutional proscriptions against cruel and 
unusual punishment.  There was scholarly debate about the value of deterrence compared 
with incapacitation.  
The literature has outlined the extant methods by which the government accounts 
for crime reported to the police and the challenges of accurately documenting criminality 
in a given community, given socio-economic differences and relationships with police. 
The challenges faced by California’s municipalities with the onset of the great recession 
have been documented as well as their impact on government’s primary function, that of 
maintaining public safety.  Police sworn staffing has been showed to have been reduced 
along with other services by cash strapped municipalities.  The efficacy of police in 
deterring crime has also been addressed, the literature being contradictory as to whether 
additional police reduces criminal activity.  Some writers found that police and crime 
rose independently but simultaneously, making it difficult to quantify the value of adding 
police. Other writers quantified the value of each added officer’s presence, as well as the 
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 cost of a realigned prisoner’s freedom.  Gascon & Foglesong (2010) struck a middle 
ground by acknowledging the greater burdens placed on police than in generations past, 
and that either crediting or ignoring the value of added police was risky in a 
fundamentally complex environment.  
 Emerging information regarding the impact of California’s response to its 
overcrowding crisis known as realignment was examined.  Not surprisingly, 
contradictory findings regarding the impact of tens of thousands of inmates flooding 
California jails and perhaps returning prematurely to California communities made it 
difficult to determine whether in the short-term, realignment has succeeded in 
maintaining public safety as its primary goal.  The state prisons were at their lowest 
levels of population in decades but still overcrowded, recidivism rates were lower, but 
property crime rates grew in the first full year after realignment.  
 The literature showed that realignment has accomplished one of its main 
objectives; shifting the burden of some 30,000 inmates to community corrections. 
Rappaport’s “shell game” (2013, p. 210), and Schlanger’s “hydra threat” (2012, p.191) 
were attempts to describe the impacts of realignment on local communities and their law 
enforcement professionals.  County sheriff and probation departments were immediately 
impacted upon implementation, in some cases resulting in jails releasing uninvolved 
occupants early to make room for realigned prisoners (Lawrence, 2013).  The 
overcrowding and accompanying early release of realigned and other inmates who would 
otherwise be in jail became the burden first for sheriffs, then probation departments, but 
ultimately for local law enforcement.  Probation departments have grown in size, scope, 
and responsibility, but have struggled to find their footing in this new world of 
community corrections. 
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 A critical piece of the reform puzzle, funding, was found to be almost non-
existent in regards to local law enforcement.  The state allocated money to counties, and 
counties delegated to Community Corrections Partnerships the responsibility of setting 
priorities and fund initiatives.  CCPs focused almost exclusively on building 
infrastructure for probation and sheriff departments; usually in the form of program 
creation for probation and expanding occupancy in county jails.  With one vote on the 
CCP, a lone police chief could hardly dictate to remaining members, all representing 
county services.  Meanwhile, local police agencies have shed thousands sworn officer 
positions as a result of the recession and reduced city revenue.  
 Most of the literature addressed the possible covariance between increases in 
police staffing and crime rates were limited to large cities.  Most of this literature also 
focused exclusively on whether increases in police officer staffing result in lower crime.  
There was very little known about the impact of police staffing in smaller, sometimes 
rural communities, and a paucity of data exists on property crime when a police force was 
reduced.  Realignment was still in its infancy, therefore nonexistent was information as to 
the judgment of sitting police chiefs as to how crime rates have been affected by the 
recession, realignment, jail overcrowding, and the aforementioned officer staffing.  
Similarly, there was no information about how effective the chiefs would rate strategies 
most likely to have been employed in response to realignment.  
 It was anticipated that in gathering the targeted data, additional knowledge would 
be gained regarding any possible impact realignment has had on smaller California 
communities and what strategies employed by local law enforcement have the most 
strategic value.  Therefore, the purpose of the study, to determine the impact of 
realignment on property crimes in smaller California cities that were likely under- 
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resourced, and the response of police chiefs to these phenomena was judged relevant 
based on a gap in the literature. 
 The following chapter contains the methodology utilized in order to obtain the 
data sought by the research questions of this study.  Specifically, Chapter III outlines the 
research design and instrumentation intended to obtain and analyze the extant historical 
data and non-parametric survey data.  The survey designed by the author was presented 
in its entirety, along with input from a panel of experts enlisted to assure the survey’s 
ability to capture intended data.  The following chapter also contains the study’s data 
collection and the three statistical tests to be used to analyze findings.  Finally, the 
chapter contains the study’s limitations.  
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
Overview 
This chapter described the methods and procedures that were used to determine 
what impact, if any, realignment has had on property crimes reported to the police in 
small California cities, defined by this study as municipalities of 25,000 to 50,000 
residents with their own police departments.  To help identify policies that could lead to 
more effective law enforcement in this environment, a survey was sent to police chiefs 
represented in the population to obtain their expert opinions on the realignment’s impact 
on property crime in their jurisdictions, and the speed and efficacy of response strategies.  
Purpose Statement 
 The primary purpose of this descriptive correlational study was to identify policy 
initiatives that could lead to more effective law enforcement against challenges presented 
by prison realignment for small California cities.  The second purpose of this study was 
to determine the relationship, if any, between sworn officer staffing and property crimes 
reported to the police from 2010 to 2012.  The third purpose of the study was to 
determine the significance of the impact of realignment, sworn officer staffing, the 
recession, and jail overcrowding on property crime as perceived by police chiefs.  
Finally, it was the purpose to identify the progress and effectiveness of specific strategies 
in response to realignment; increased law enforcement partnerships, seeking alternative 
funding, altering staffing models, and engaging non-law enforcement stakeholders as 
perceived by police chiefs. 
Research Questions 
 This paper proposes to answer the following questions regarding California cities 
with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that have their own police departments: 
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1) To what extent is there a difference in property crimes in 2010 and 2012?  
2) To what extent is there a difference in sworn police officer staffing in 2010 
and 2012?  
3) To what extent is there a correlation between changes in sworn officer staffing 
and changes in property crime for 2010 and 2012? 
4) To what extent were the following factors significant with respect to property 
crime within the jurisdictions from 2010-2012? 
a. AB 109 Public Safety Realignment 
b. The current economic recession 
c. The police department’s sworn officer staffing levels 
d. County or local jail overcrowding 
5)  To what extent do chiefs perceive that progress has been made in the 
following strategies responding to realignment? 
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies 
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants 
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments 
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned 
probationers 
6)  How effective do chiefs perceive the following strategies are in response to 
realignment? 
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies 
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants 
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments 
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned  
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probationers 
Research Design 
 This study was a descriptive correlational study supported by archival data as well 
as new data obtained from experts in the field via a survey.  As for the archival data, a 
quantitative approach was indicated because of the well-established units of measurement 
for property crime in communities via the Uniform Crime Report, as well as the number 
of sworn police personnel (Patten, 2009).  These data were objective in nature, and as 
McMillan and Schumacher (2010, p.489) pointed out, were better “gathered and analyzed 
numerically”.  Patten (2009) also recognized the value of a quantitative approach when 
attempting to obtain information from participants, in this case police chiefs, who were 
not available for in-depth interviews.  
 The proposed survey allowed for a timely snapshot of the opinions of participants, 
aligned as it with the purpose of the study (McMillan &Schumacher, 2010).  The survey 
was sent to police chiefs in the population via Survey Monkey, and results were analyzed 
using standard analysis software.  Values were attached to the possible survey responses 
to permit proper analysis later.  
 Purposive sampling has been defined as processes where subjects were selected 
for their unique attributes, and not randomly (Bachmann &Schutt, 2013).  Chiefs were 
selected to inform on topic of study because of their unique position of knowledge, 
perspective and influence over policy (Rubin & Rubin, 2010).  These cities were selected 
primarily because of population size: more than 50,000 increased the likelihood of 
greater resources at their disposal and thus not subject to the vagaries of recessionary 
setbacks, and less than 25,000 included many cities policed by the county sheriff, usually 
the largest and most resourced law enforcement agency in a county.  
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Participants received an introductory letter from the researcher, informing them of 
the impending survey that invited them to participate.  Chiefs were sent the survey via 
email with an introductory paragraph identifying the researcher, explaining the purpose 
of the study and the survey, and an invitation to participate via an embedded hyperlink to 
the survey’s uniform resource locator (URL).  
Population 
 A study’s population has been described as the largest similar group from which 
the study’s findings can be generalized (McMillan &Schumacher, 2010).  The population 
of this study was police chiefs of California cities with their own police departments and 
populations of between 25,000 and 50,000.  Data from the 2010 U.S. Census indicates 
well over 60 California cities have between 25,000 and 50,000 residents, but a review of 
each city’s website show only 56 were policed by their own organic police department, 
led by a chief of police.  These 56 chiefs make up the population for this study.  
Sample 
 McMillan &Schumacher (2010) described a sample in a quantitative study as the 
number of those participants from whom data was ultimately collected.  Since the study 
was directed at chiefs empowered to dictate the tempo and content of policies, strategies 
and their implementation, the study’s population was the chiefs of those cities, and the 
sample consists of the 36 chiefs that responded to the survey outlined below.    
Instrumentation 
 Tafoya, Grattet, and Bird (2014) recognized the need to quantify results from 
realignment to build on the knowledge of evidence-based practices.  They strongly 
recommended a unified and collaborative approach to data.  This study utilized data from 
two primary sources; archival crime rate and officer staffing data, and information  
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obtained through the use of the survey.  Since no readily available and previously 
validated surveys existed that captured data sought by this study, one was designed to 
obtain this information.  This survey was vetted by a panel of experts consisting of sitting 
police chiefs in an effort to address validity. 
Survey Focus 
 The four factors itemized in Survey Question 1 have been identified for 
contemplation by the participants because of their prominence in the literature already 
outlined regarding the time period immediately before and immediately after 
realignment.  These factors were realignment, sworn officer staffing, the recession, and 
jail overcrowding.  Participants were asked to rate each of those four factors as to their 
potential influence on property crimes in their cities.  The specific language to be utilized 
in the survey was listed below.  
 As well, participants were asked to rate the effectiveness of strategies they may 
have employed in response to realignment.  These strategies were identified due to their 
prominence as previously administered during other periods of adaptation by law 
enforcement professionals.  The participants were asked to quantify the speed at which 
these strategies have been implemented, if at all.   
 This survey’s design was intended to solicit critical data unique to a city’s chief of 
police.  Their opinion of the impact of landmark changes to the correctional landscape, 
along with descriptive data that did or did not covary with property crime rates in their 
cities addressed deficiencies outlined in the problem statement of this study.  Also, a 
survey method was selected because of the ability to administer questions where credible 
data were required from a rather large sample, and was an efficient way to acquire data 
that can be generalized using regression analysis (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010).  
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 Survey Questions 1, 2, and 3 align with Research Questions 4, 5, and 6 and are found in 
Appendix A. 
 Expert Panel.  To quantify the survey’s value to police executives as outlined in 
the purpose statement and to reinforce validity and reliability, selected members of the 
Orange County Police Chiefs’ and Sheriff’s Association were asked to provide feedback 
on the survey’s focus and questions, thereby acting as a panel of experts.  The 
Association meets monthly to coordinate the law enforcement efforts of the three million 
residents of Orange County.  The Association has members who are chiefs of police of 
cities ranging in size from Anaheim (population 336,000) to La Palma (population 
16,000).  
 Validity and reliability.  The question of an instrument’s content validity 
revolves around its alignment with the domain it seeks to inform (Waltz, Strickland, & 
Lenz, 2003), and whether adequate sampling in the instrument addresses the subject 
under investigation (Wynd, Schmidt, & Schaefer, 2003).  Reliability in an instrument was 
strong when steps have been taken to reduce the chance of random error or a change in 
circumstances (Bachmann & Schutt, 2013).  This panel of nine chiefs comprised of the 
most experienced and tenured professionals in their respective departments were uniquely 
qualified to judge the survey’s content.  Like the population and sample, the panel’s 
members addressed realignment during the same time period as policy makers, and could 
respond thoughtfully as whether the instrument’s findings could be value to a law 
enforcement executive.   
 The panel was asked to comment on the survey’s focus areas and strategies, and 
whether knowledge of employment of these strategies could be beneficial in crafting 
future police response to prison reform that realigns inmates from state to community  
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corrections. 
 This effort sought confirmation that the survey questions align with their 
knowledge and experience in their jurisdictions, and whether information gathered from 
this survey could shed light on the effectiveness of the identified strategies.  Panelists 
were asked the following questions: 
1.  I am studying how impactful these four areas were with respect to property 
crime rates from 2010 to 2012; Public Safety Realignment, the recession, officer staffing 
levels, and jail overcrowding.  In your opinion, how well or how poorly do these four 
factors correspond with factors impacting property crime rates from 2010 to 2012?  
2.  I am studying the effectiveness of certain strategies that have been employed 
in response to Public Safety Realignment, namely; increasing partnerships with allied law 
enforcement agencies, seeking alternative funding solutions such as grants, creating 
specialized units or reoriented existing specialized units, and engaging with non-law 
enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned probationers.  How well or how poorly 
do you believe these strategies illustrate what you may have or did employ in response to 
realignment? 
3.  I will soon be asking other chiefs in the state how quickly and how effectively 
they implemented these strategies.  How helpful would this feedback be to you regarding 
the evaluation of your own response to Public Safety Realignment?      
The panel provided feedback and their responses tend to validate the premise of 
the research questions and the value of the data the study seeks to obtain (See Appendix 
B).  First, as to the impact upon property crime by the variables listed, eight of nine chiefs 
agreed the variables highly corresponded to property crime trends for that time period.  
One chief believed the variables somewhat corresponded, and no chiefs believed there 
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 was no correspondence.  As to how well the response strategies in the survey reflected 
their own experience, four chiefs answered these strategies highly corresponded with 
their own experience, five chiefs said the strategies somewhat corresponded, and no 
chiefs said the strategies did not correspond.  Third, as to whether knowledge of other 
chiefs’ responses to realignment would be helpful to their own evaluative process, five 
chiefs said this information would be highly helpful, three chiefs said this would be 
somewhat helpful, and one chief said this would not help at all.  Due to the 
preponderance of responses indicating the survey as designed satisfied the primary 
purpose of the study, there were no changes made (See Appendix B).  
Data Collection 
 The first three chapters of this study underwent a review by Brandman 
University’s School of Education Quality Review Committee.  Once approved by Quality 
Review (QR), the University’s Institutional Review Board (BUIRB) assured the proposed 
study was in compliance with the University’s high standards for integrity and quality, 
and protecting the rights of the study’s participants.  Once QR and BUIRB completed 
their review and formal approval was received, the author began collecting and analyzing 
data as outlined.  Data collection consisted of two phases: archival data collection and 
collection of survey data. 
Archival Data 
 Crime data.  Police departments were required to report to the FBI on their most 
serious offences reported to the police for each calendar year.  The eight most serious 
offences were called Part 1 Crimes and consist of criminal homicide, forcible rape, 
robbery, aggravated assault, arson, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft (FBI, 2012).  
A total number of these offenses were aggregated and reported publically by the FBI  
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through their online portal.  Data was gathered for calendar 2010 (Appendix C) and 2012 
(Appendix D).  These data were in the public domain.  
 Police staffing data.  Each police department reports on the number of its sworn 
employees in the same report.  These data were in the public domain. 
 Population data.  Population data for 2010 was from the 2010 US Census.  
Population data for 2012 was from the California Department of Finance, and consists of 
a population estimate for each city based on growth models and 2010 US Census data 
(DOF, 2014).  The author collected property crimes reported to the police and sworn 
officer staffing data on a Word Excel spreadsheet for analytical purposes.  
Survey administration.  The chiefs in the population received an introductory 
letter from the author outlining the nature and purpose of the study inviting them to 
participate (See Appendix E).  This letter was followed by an informational email also 
inviting them to participate.  This email outlined the author’s role as a doctoral candidate, 
the purpose of the study, and the fact that their participation would be kept confidential.  
The email contained a URL linking to the Survey Monkey site and the survey itself.  
Once at the survey site, the chiefs were asked to read a section regarding informed 
consent, and upon approval could take the survey.  
Data Analysis 
 Three separate tests were used to analyze the data.  As to Research Questions 1 
and 2, a paired-samples t-test were utilized to identify and measure the difference, if any, 
between property crime reported to the police in the calendar year immediately before 
(2010) and after (2012) the implementation of realignment.  Similarly, a paired-samples 
t-test was used to identify and measure the difference, if any, between sworn officer 
staffing in the calendar year immediately before (2010) and after (2012) the  
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implementation of realignment.  The paired-samples t-test was utilized because it allows 
the researcher to determine the difference between two means (Patten, 2009), in this case 
pre and post property crime data and sworn officer staffing for cities in the sample.  
 For Research Question 3, Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation test, characterized 
a powerful tool not prone to error for non-parametric measurements, was used to 
determine the relationship, if any, between differences in property crimes reported to the 
police and police officer staffing (Bishara & Hittner, 2012).  The Spearman test was 
chosen over the more common Pearson product-moment correlation due to the likely 
small sample size (n ≈ 40-50). 
 For Research Questions 4, 5, and 6, using responses to the survey, Friedman’s test 
will be used to identify the relationship between property crime in those cities and four 
factors previously mentioned, as well as the responses from chiefs as to the speed and 
effectiveness of response strategies.  Use of Friedman’s test was indicated because of the 
non-parametric nature of the results of three or more matched groups (Siegel, 1988).  
Also, Friedman’s test was chosen instead of the more common repeated measures 
ANOVA test because of the likely small sample and the ordinal nature of the ratings. 
Limitations 
 According to the California Department of Finance, as of 2013 there were 482 
incorporated cities within the state (DOF, 2014).  Of these, 92 had populations of 
between 25,000 and 50,000.  Of those 92 cities, 56 have their own municipal police 
departments, while the remainder had contractual relationships with their county sheriff 
for law enforcement services.  Only those 56 cities with their own police departments 
will be studied.  
 This study’s primary limitation was that it deals exclusively with California’s 
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 realignment law, and none of the other 49 states and territories currently have 
realignment efforts underway in anything close to this state’s depth and scale.  Second, 
this study focuses on realignment’s impact on property crimes reported to the police, and 
as such does provide insight on what impact realignment may have had on violent crime. 
The third limitation was the size of the population and sample; capturing data on 
California’s 56 cities with their own police departments and a population of between 
25,000 and 50,000, excludes larger and smaller cities and those policed by their county 
sheriff.  These limitations therefore limit any inferential conclusion or extrapolations that 
could be made outside the state or in jurisdictions outside of California.  
Summary 
 The methodology described above was designed to facilitate the gathering and 
analysis of extant, archival data regarding property crime incidents reported to the police 
and sworn police officer staffing.  The survey was designed to elicit responses from 
police chiefs on primary influencers of property crime in their cities, as well as shedding 
light on the speed and efficacy of strategic responses to realignment.  Together these data 
should provide information on the impact of realignment as well as police responses to 
realignment not currently in the literature.   
 Chapter IV presented the data and analyzed the findings.  Chapter IV presented 
tables containing property crime data and sworn officer staffing reported by the cities for 
relevant years, correlational tests conducted on these extant data, and presented the 
findings of the survey administered to the chiefs in the population.  
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CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH, DATA COLLECTION, AND FINDINGS 
Overview 
 The previous chapter presented the research methodology proposed in order to 
gather and analyze data that seek to answer the research questions. The three tests used to 
analyze the descriptive archival data as well as the survey’s development and 
administration strategy was presented.  This chapter will present and analyze findings 
from the study.  The purpose of the study, research questions, methodology, population 
and sample are summarized.  An introduction with tables containing data comprising the 
descriptive statistics and frequency changes of the population and sample of the study are 
presented.  Data and a statistical analysis are presented for each of the six research 
questions, with the assistance of an accompanying table for clarity. 
Purpose Statement 
 The primary purpose of this descriptive correlational study was to identify policy 
initiatives that could lead to more effective law enforcement against challenges presented 
by prison realignment for small California cities.  The second purpose of this study was 
to determine the relationship, if any, between sworn officer staffing and property crimes 
reported to the police from 2010 to 2012.  The third purpose of the study was to 
determine the significance of the impact of realignment, sworn officer staffing, the 
recession, and jail overcrowding on property crime as perceived by police chiefs.  
Finally, it was the purpose of the study to identify the progress and effectiveness of 
specific strategies in response to realignment; increased law enforcement partnerships, 
seeking alternative funding, altering staffing models, and engaging non-law enforcement 
stakeholders as perceived by police chiefs. 
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Research Questions 
 This paper proposes to answer the following questions regarding California cities 
with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that have their own police departments: 
1) To what extent is there a difference in property crimes in 2010 and 2012?  
2) To what extent is there a difference in sworn police officer staffing in 2010 
and 2012?  
3) To what extent is there a correlation between changes in sworn officer staffing 
and changes in property crime for 2010 and 2012? 
4) To what extent were the following factors significant with respect to property 
crime within the jurisdictions from 2010-2012? 
a. AB 109 Public Safety Realignment 
b. The current economic recession 
c. The police department’s sworn officer staffing levels 
d. County or local jail overcrowding 
5)  To what extent do chiefs perceive that progress has been made in the 
following strategies responding to realignment? 
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies 
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants 
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments 
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned 
probationers 
6)  How effective do chiefs perceive the following strategies are in response to 
realignment? 
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies 
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b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants 
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments 
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned 
probationers 
Research Methods and Data Collection Procedures 
 Data collection consisted of two phases: archival data collection and collection of 
survey data.  
Archival Data 
 Crime data.  Police departments were required to report to the FBI on their most 
serious offences reported them each year.  The eight most serious offences were called 
Part 1 Crimes and consist of criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated 
assault, arson, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft (FBI, 2012).  A total number of 
these offenses were aggregated and reported publically by the FBI through their online 
portal.  Data was gathered for calendar 2010 and 2012.  These data were in the public 
domain.  
 Police staffing data.  Each police department reported on the number of its sworn 
employees in the same report.  These data were in the public domain. 
 Population data.  Population data for 2010 was from the 2010 US Census. 
Population data for 2012 was from the California Department of Finance, and consists of 
a population estimate for each city based on growth models and 2010 US Census data 
(DOF, 2014).  The study utilized property crime data as reported to the police, and sworn 
officer staffing data.  For analytical purposes, these data were placed on a Word Excel 
spreadsheet.  These data were in the public domain. 
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Survey administration.  The police chiefs in the population were sent an 
introductory letter from the author outlining the nature and purpose of the study inviting 
them to participate.  This letter was followed by an informational email also inviting 
them to participate.  This email outlined the author’s role as a doctoral candidate, the 
purpose of the study, and the fact that their participation will be anonymous.  The email 
contained a URL linked to Survey Monkey wherein the survey could be accessed.  Once 
at the survey site, the chiefs were asked to read a section regarding informed consent, and 
upon approval were able to complete the survey (See Appendix F).   
Data Analysis 
 Three separate tests were used to analyze the data.  As to Research Questions 1 
and 2, a paired-samples t-test was utilized to identify and measure the difference, if any,  
between property crime reported to the police in the calendar year immediately before 
(2010) and after (2012) the implementation of realignment.  Similarly, a paired-samples 
t-test was used to identify and measure the difference, if any, between sworn officer 
staffing in the calendar year immediately before (2010) and after (2012) the 
implementation of realignment.   
 For Research Question 3, Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation test was used to 
determine the relationship, if any, between differences in property crimes reported to the 
police and police officer staffing.   
 For Research Questions 4, 5, and 6, Friedman’s test was used to identify the 
relationship between property crime in those cities and four factors previously mentioned, 
as well as the responses from chiefs as to the speed and effectiveness of response 
strategies.   
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Population 
 The population of this study was police chiefs of California cities with their own 
police departments and populations of between 25,000 and 50,000.  Data from the 2010 
U.S. Census indicates well over 60 California cities have between 25,000 and 50,000 
residents, but a review of each city’s website show that only 56 were policed by their 
own police department, led by a chief of police.   
Sample 
 Since the study was directed at chiefs who were empowered to dictate the tempo 
and content of policy response and implementation, the study’s population was the chiefs 
of those cities, and the sample consists of the 36 chiefs of police who responded to the 
survey.    
Presentation and Analysis of Data 
Table 7 displays descriptive statistics for population, property crime and numbers of 
sworn officers for 2010 and 2012.  The table also includes change data.  Specifically, 
percentage changes from 2010 to 2012 were that: (a) population increased (M = 1.34);  
(b) raw changes in crimes increased (M = 3.60); (c) raw changes in officers decreased  
(M = -5.56); (d) change in crimes per 1,000 increased (M = 2.21); and (e) change in 
officers per 10,000 decreased (M = -6.81). 
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Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for Selected Data (n = 56) 
 
 
 
 
 Table 8 displays the frequency counts for changes in property crimes and sworn 
officers.  Based on raw crime numbers, 34 of 56 cities (60.7%) had some sort of increase 
while for raw officer numbers, 47 of 56 cities (83.9%) had a decrease in the number of 
officers.  Using population adjusted data, 57.1% of the cities had increases in their 
property crime rate while 85.7% experienced a decrease in the number of sworn officers. 
Table 8 
Frequency Counts for Changes in Property Crimes and Sworn Officers 
 Decrease Increase 
 n % n % 
Property Crime 22 39.3 34 60.7 
     
Officers 47 83.9 9 16.1 
Crimes per 1,000 People 24 42.9 32 57.1 
Officers per 10,000 people 48 85.7 8 14.3 
Note. n = 56 
 
 
 
 
 2010 2012 Percent Change 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Population 35,627.73 6,820.57 36,109.82 6,943.65 1.34 1.33 
Property Crime 991.50 484.15 1,032.82 540.15 3.60 17.61 
Officers 46.05 19.77 43.70 18.96 -5.56 -8.78 
Crimes per 
1,000 People 
27.64 12.14 28.24 13.41 2.21 17.05 
Officers per 
10,000 people 
12.91 4.97 12.06 4.63 -6.81 8.58 
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Research Question 1 
 Regarding California cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that have 
their own police departments, to what extent is there a difference in property crimes in 
2010 and 2012?  
To answer this question, Table 9 displays the relevant paired t-tests.  Using raw 
data, overall property crimes (p= .06) tended to be higher in 2012 (M = 1,032.82) than in 
2010 (M = 991.50).  However, when property crimes were adjusted for population, no 
difference was found (p = .35)  
Table 9 
Paired t-tests for Selected Variables Comparing 2010 to 2012   
 2010 2012  
 M SD M SD t  p  
Population 35,627.73 6,820.57 36,109.82 6,943.65 7.86 .001 
Property Crime 991.50 484.15 1,032.82 540.15 1.95 .06 
Officers 46.05 19.77 43.70 18.96 4.77 .001 
Crimes per  
1,000 People 
27.64 12.14 28.24 13.41 .94 .35 
Officers per 
10,000 people 
12.91 4.97 12.06 4.63 5.84 .001 
 Note. n = 56 
Research Question 2 
 Regarding California cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that have 
their own police departments, to what extent is there a difference in sworn police officer 
staffing in 2010 and 2012? 
 To answer this question, Table 9 above is used again to display the relevant paired 
t-tests.  Number of sworn officers declined both using raw data (p = .001) and population 
adjusted data (p = .001). 
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Research Question 3 
 Regarding California cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that have 
their own police departments, to what extent is there a correlation between changes in 
sworn officer staffing and changes in property crime for 2010 and 2012? 
 Table 10 displays the relevant Spearman correlations.  No significant correlations 
were found for either the raw change data (rs = .09, p = .49) or the population adjusted 
change data (rs = .08, p = .57). 
Table 10 
Correlations Comparing Changes in Population, Crimes and Officers (N = 56) 
 Population Property Crimes Officers 
Raw    
Population 1.0   
Property Crimes .11 1.0  
Officers -.01 .09 1.0 
Population Adjusted    
Population 1.0   
Property Crimes .04 1.0  
Officers -.13 .08 1.0 
Note. n = 56 
Research Question 4 
 To what extent were the following factors significant with respect to property crime 
within the jurisdictions from 2010-2012? 
a. AB 109 Public Safety Realignment 
b. The current economic recession 
c. The police department’s sworn officer staffing levels 
  d. County or local jail overcrowding 
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 To answer this question, Table 11 displays the ratings for the perceptions of the 
factors that led to increases in property crimes.  These ratings were based on a four-point 
metric:  1 = Not at all significant to 4 = Highly Significant.  A Friedman repeated 
measures ANOVA test found no significant differences (p = .16) among the four ratings.  
Inspection of the table found the highest factor was item 1a, “AB 109 California’s Public 
Safety Realignment law (M = 2.71)” and the lowest rated item was item 1c, “My 
department’s sworn officer staffing levels (M = 2.17)”. 
Table 11 
Ratings for Perceptions of the Factors that Led to Increases in Property Crime 
 M SD 
AB 109 Public Safety Realignment Law 2.71 0.86 
County or local jail overcrowding 2.60 1.01 
The current economic recession 2.37 0.84 
My department’s sworn officer staffing levels 2.17 1.04 
Note. n = 35; Ratings were based on a 4-point metric: 1 = Not at all significant to 4 = 
Highly Significant.  Friedman Repeated Measures Test Result: χ2 (3, n = 35) = 5.21,  
p = .16. 
 
Research Question 5 
 To what extent do chiefs perceive that progress has been made in the following 
strategies responding to realignment? 
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies 
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants 
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments 
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned 
probationers 
 To answer this question, Table 12 displays the ratings for the extent that specific 
property crime reducing strategies had been implemented.  These ratings were based on a 
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4-point metric:  1 = Not Considered to 4 = Fully Implemented.  A Friedman repeated 
measures ANOVA test found significant differences (p = .001) among the four ratings.  
Inspection of the table found the highest strategy was item 2a, “Increased partnerships 
with allied law enforcement agencies (M = 3.33)” and the lowest rated strategy was item 
2d, “Engaged with non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned 
probationers (M = 2.06)” (Table 12). 
Table 12 
Ratings for Extent Property Crime Reducing Strategies had Been Implemented 
 M SD 
Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement 
agencies 
3.33 0.63 
Created specialized units or reoriented existing 
specialized units 
2.86 1.17 
Sought alternative funding solutions such as grants 2.25 1.02 
Engaged with non-law enforcement partners to 
impact or serve realigned probationers 
2.06 1.12 
Note. n = 36; Ratings were based on a 4-point metric: 1 = Not at all significant to 4 = 
Highly Significant.  Friedman Repeated Measures Test Result: χ2 (3, n = 36) = 26.96, p = 
.001. 
 
 
Research Question 6 
 How effective do chiefs perceive the following strategies are in response to     
realignment? 
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies 
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants 
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments 
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned 
probationers 
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To answer this question, Table 13 displays the ratings for the effectiveness of 
specific property crime reducing strategies.  These ratings were based on a four-point 
metric:  1 = Not at all effective to 4 = Significantly Effective.  A Friedman repeated 
measures ANOVA test found significant differences (p = .001) among the four ratings.  
Inspection of the table found the highest strategy was item 3a, “Increased partnerships 
with allied law enforcement agencies (M = 2.85)” and the lowest rated strategy was item 
3b, “Sought alternative funding solutions such as grants (M = 1.76)”. 
Table 13 
Ratings for Extent Property Crime Reducing Strategies had Been Implemented 
 M SD 
Increase partnerships with allied law 
enforcement agencies 
2.85 0.74 
Created specialized units or reoriented 
existing specialized units 
2.66 1.07 
Engaged with non-law enforcement 
partners to impact or serve realigned 
probationers 
1.87 0.76 
Sought alternative funding solutions 
such as grants 
1.76 0.79 
Note. n = 36; Ratings were based on a 4-point metric: 1 = Not at all effective to 4 = 
Significantly effective.  Friedman Repeated Measures Test Result: χ2 (3, n = 31) = 27.69, 
p = .001. 
 
Summary 
 The purpose of this study was to identify the possible impact of realignment on 
property crimes for smaller California cities.  This impact could have been influenced by 
the fewer sworn police officers, crowded jails, and the current economic recession.  In 
addition to descriptive data that would analyze potential strength of differences, the 
opinion of the police chiefs as to the how property crimes were influenced by these 
factors, how quickly they responded and how effectively these strategies were in 
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 responding to realignment.  It was a purpose of the study to provide police chiefs with 
data that could help address future reform efforts with a net effect of placing offenders 
back into the community. 
 Statistical analysis of the descriptive data indicated an increase in property crimes 
for 34 of the 56 cities, but this increase was impactful but not statistically significant.  
The analysis did show a statistically significant decrease in sworn officer staffing for 47 
of the 56 cities.  Analysis comparing property crimes against sworn officer staffing levels 
did not identify a correlation between these two variables.   
 With respect to the survey results, the highest-rated factor which chiefs identified 
as impacting property crimes in their jurisdictions was realignment, however, there was 
not a significant difference among the other potential factors that could have led to higher 
property crime rates in their cities.  As to which strategy was implemented faster than the 
others presented, chiefs reported increasing partnerships with allied agencies was 
completely or partially implemented at a higher rate than the other strategies 
contemplated by the survey. Similarly, when asked to rate the effectiveness of the 
strategies offered, partnering with other law enforcement professionals was most likely to 
be rated as effective or significantly effective as compared to the other three strategy 
choices.  
 In the following chapter, the major findings of the study will be presented in light 
of the existing literature.  Unexpected findings will also be presented.  Conclusions made 
as a result of the study, including implications for further research and recommendations 
in light of the findings and existing literature, are provided. 
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CHAPTER V: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 The previous chapter outlined the data gathered and whether that data pointed to 
significant statistical conclusions.  This chapter will compare and summarize what was 
found in the review of the literature, draw conclusions and implications, and then make a 
series of recommendations.   
Purpose Statement 
 The primary purpose of this descriptive correlational study was to identify policy 
initiatives that could lead to more effective law enforcement against challenges presented 
by prison realignment for small California cities.  The second purpose of this study was 
to determine differences and relationships, if any, between sworn officer staffing and 
property crimes reported to the police from 2010 to 2012.  The third purpose of the study 
was to determine the significance of the impact of realignment, sworn officer staffing, the 
recession, and jail overcrowding on property crime as perceived by police chiefs.  
Finally, it was the purpose to identify the progress and effectiveness of specific strategies 
in response to realignment; increased law enforcement partnerships, seeking alternative 
funding, altering staffing models, and engaging non-law enforcement stakeholders as 
perceived by police chiefs. 
Research Questions 
 Regarding California cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that have 
their own police departments: 
1) To what extent is there a difference in property crimes in 2010 and 2012?  
2) To what extent is there a difference in sworn police officer staffing in 2010 
and 2012?  
3) To what extent is there a correlation between changes in sworn officer staffing  
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and changes in property crime for 2010 and 2012? 
4) To what extent were the following factors significant with respect to property 
crime within the jurisdictions from 2010-2012? 
a. AB 109 Public Safety Realignment 
b. The current economic recession 
c. The police department’s sworn officer staffing levels 
d. County or local jail overcrowding 
5)  To what extent do chiefs perceive that progress has been made in the 
following strategies responding to realignment? 
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies 
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants 
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments 
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned 
probationers 
 6)  How effective do chiefs perceive the following strategies are in response to     
realignment? 
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies 
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants 
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments 
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned 
probationers 
Methodology 
 Archival property crime and sworn officer staffing data were collected from the 
FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports.  An online survey was designed and administered to the  
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police chiefs in the population.  Three tests were used to analyze the collected data.  A 
paired sampled t-test was used to determine the extent of differences in property crime 
and officer staffing for 2010 and 2012.  Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation test was 
used to determine the relationship, if any, between differences in property crimes 
reported to the police and police officer staffing.  Finally, Friedman’s test was used to 
identify the relationship between property crime in those cities and four factors 
previously mentioned, as well as the responses from chiefs as to the speed and 
effectiveness of response strategies.   
Major Findings 
  The following will summarize the major findings of this study by research 
question. 
Research Question 1 
Regarding California cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that 
have their own police departments, to what extent is there a difference in property crimes 
in 2010 and 2012? 
The data and subsequent analysis indicates there was a meaningful trend upward 
of property crimes between the two relevant years.  The difference in property crimes 
between 2010 and 2012, however, was not statistically significant.   Of the 56 cities 
examined, 34 showed an increase in property crimes reported to the police.  Importantly, 
22 of the cities reported either stable or a great deal fewer property crimes.  The disparate 
nature of these results are especially stark when reviewing Table 7; one city had nearly a 
31% decrease in property crimes pre and post implementation while another city suffered 
a nearly 72% increase in property crimes over the same period. 
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While some might see these findings as contradictory, the disparate nature of 
increases and decreases in property crime in the post realignment era is consistent with 
recent findings which led some writers to discount realignment’s impact on crime 
increases (Males & Buchen, 2013) while others provided evidence California’s recent 
increases in property crime correlated to the addition of 18,000 inmates into the 
community (Lofstrom & Raphael, 2013).  In addition to the 56 cities in the sample, 
California as a whole had greater increases in property crime than the other 49 states 
(Scheidigger, 2013; FBI, 2012).  Clearly, California led the way in an increase in 
property crime during this period, but the data is contradictory as to a correlation with the 
implementation of AB 109.   
Research Question 2 
Regarding California cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that 
have their own police departments, to what extent is there a difference in sworn police 
officer staffing in 2010 and 2012? 
The study found numbers of sworn police officers serving in the police 
departments within the population decreased significantly.  Only eight departments 
actually increased their sworn officer staffing during this period, but 48 saw their 
numbers decline (Table 8).  The average department in the study lost about two officers 
over this three-year span.  These findings are consistent with what has occurred 
statewide, with 3,700 fewer officers policing the streets in California in 2012 compared 
to 2008 (FBI, 2012), and the overall disproportionate negative impact on local 
enforcement (Petersilia, 2013).  
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Research Question 3 
Regarding California cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that 
have their own police departments, to what extent is there a correlation between changes 
in sworn officer staffing and changes in property crime for 2010 and 2012? 
This study could not identify a correlation between changes in sworn officer 
staffing and property crime for the relevant years studied.  It is possible that no 
correlation could be identified in part due to the mixed results related to property crimes 
in the population during this time period. With almost 40% of the cities in the population 
showing stable or fewer property crimes, finding a correlation between property crime 
and officer staffing was not supported. 
The literature once again suggests divergent views as to what degree increases in 
officer staffing lead to lower crimes rates.  There is agreement that officer staffing was 
driven to lower levels due to the recession (Wilson & Heinonen, 2011).  In terms of 
deterrence, most support the idea that more officers might be effective in deterring crime 
(Levitt, 2004; Guffey, Larson & Kelso, 2010: Ball, 2011; Kleck & Barnes, 2010; Chalfin, 
2013; Clear & Frost, 2014), while others believe that more police do not necessarily 
reduce crime but higher crime almost always leads to additional police (Marvell & 
Moody, 1996).  
Research Question 4 
To what extent were the following factors significant with respect to property 
crime within the jurisdictions from 2010-2012? 
a. AB 109 Public Safety Realignment 
b. The current economic recession 
c. The police department’s sworn officer staffing levels 
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d. County or local jail overcrowding 
This question was designed to learn the chiefs’ opinions as to what degree the 
four factors listed in the survey had an impact on property crime in their jurisdiction.  In 
descending order, those: factors judged as either significant or highly significant were as 
follows: realignment, jail overcrowding, the recession, and officer staffing levels. 
Differences among the factors were not statistically significant.  Twenty-two of the 36 
chiefs completing the survey believed realignment to be a significant or highly significant 
factor with respect to property crime from 2010-2012.  Interestingly, only 14 chiefs held 
the belief that their sworn officer staffing levels were a significant or highly significant 
factor related to property crime trends in their jurisdictions for the same time period.  
This is meaningful given that 84% of the agencies saw their officer levels fall.  
Realignment and subsequent jail overcrowding have previously been identified as 
correlated, as well as the negative effect of displaced on local law enforcement 
(Schlanger, 2012; Hill, et al, 2013; Lawrence, 2013; Rappaport, 2013).  The evidence 
suggests realignment has negatively impacted stakeholders, especially among highly 
populated counties (Lofstrom & Rafael, 2013).  These findings tend to underpin the 
concern chiefs had regarding the implementation of realignment and overcrowding in 
their local jails. 
Research Question 5 
To what extent do chiefs perceive that progress has been made in the following 
strategies responding to realignment? 
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies 
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants 
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments 
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d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned 
probationers 
Chiefs were given the opportunity to report on four strategies they may have 
implemented in response to realignment.  In descending order of either partially or fully 
implemented, chiefs reported increasing partnerships allied law enforcement agencies, 
the creation of specialized units, seeking alternative funding, and non-law enforcement 
partnering.  None of the chiefs reported that he/she had not considered increasing 
partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies, and 16 chiefs reported that they had 
not even considered engaging with non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve 
realigned probationers.  These findings point to a significant preference by the chiefs 
toward the strategy of increasing partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies, and 
little progress in engaging with non-law-enforcement partners to serve realigned 
offenders. 
Blumenstein and Wallman (2006) cast doubt about the efficacy of specific 
policing strategies, especially as they relate to reducing crime, since crime is connected to 
complex societal issues that common policing strategies do not address.  The survey’s 
findings suggest chiefs sought to create effective partnerships with like-tasked agencies 
coalesce with other findings that acknowledge realignment funding initially benefitted 
county organizations (Petersilia & Lin, 2012; Ducart, 2013).  
Research Question 6 
How effective do chiefs perceive the following strategies are in response to     
realignment? 
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies 
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants 
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c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments 
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned 
probationers 
For the final research question, chiefs were asked to rate their effectiveness of 
these strategies.  In keeping with the findings outlined previously, none of the chiefs rated 
increasing partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies as “not at all effective.”  
Indeed, 22 of the 34 chiefs rated their efforts to increase these partnerships as either 
effective or significantly effective.  Of the remaining strategies, creating specialized units 
of officers to respond to realignment was rated either effective or significantly effective 
by 19 of the chiefs.  Only seven chiefs rated seeking alternative funding solutions and 
engaging with non-law enforcement as either effective or significantly effective. 
The proactive nature of the strategies rated most effective by law enforcement 
leadership is not surprising, a common response by police although proactive or directed 
policing has produced uneven results (Withrow & Dailey, 2012; Weisburd & Telep, 
2014; Wilson & Weiss, 2014).  To summarize, according to the study participants, 
realignment was the most influential factor impacting property crime and increased 
partnership with allied law enforcement was the most effective strategy selected and most 
aggressively implemented.   
Unexpected Findings 
Property crime increases were not universal across the population subsequent to 
the implementation of realignment; almost 40% of the cities studied saw a decrease in 
property crime (Table 8).  With almost 84% of the cities in the population sustaining a 
concurrent decrease in officer staffing levels, many of the cities that enjoyed a decrease 
in property crime also lost police officers over this time period.  
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The literature has already found evidence officer staffing levels dropped given the 
virulent nature of the great recession on municipal budgets (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 
2014).  Faced with statistically significant decreases in officer staffing levels among most 
of the population, it was unexpected to see the weight the chiefs gave to their sworn 
officer losses.  They rated realignment, the recession and jail overcrowding as more 
influential on property crime than having fewer officers on hand, surprising since most 
police chiefs face a constant struggle to defend their department’s resources, made 
scarcer since 2008.   
Conclusions 
 The findings of this study lead to the following conclusions:  
1. Most of the cities that made up the population of this study saw an increase in 
Part 1 property crime from 2010 to 2012.  While this difference was not 
statistically significant, in part due to the variance in property crimes 
population-wide, the fact that so many Californians within the jurisdiction of 
this study suffered greater property loss during this time period is impactful 
from a public policy standpoint.  Research indicates public policy is often 
driven by the public’s perception of crime, which historically results in get-
tough approaches that begin a cycle of prison overcrowding.  Policy makers 
and legislators should take into account a broad range of public safety 
indicators and evidenced-based practices before making reforms, especially 
when reforms have the net effect of reversing the incapacitating nature of 
keeping repeat offenders in custody.  
2. A significant number of the cities within the population of this study saw a 
decrease in sworn officer staffing from 2010 to 2012.  Couched amidst a  
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historic recession, without dedicated funding to respond to realignment, many 
police departments represented in this study were bereft of whatever 
incapacitative or deterrent effect these officers could have created.  The 
research supports the idea that recruitment and retention of qualified police 
officers is both challenging and critical to public safety.  Further attrition of 
police officers in these communities has the potential to reach public safety 
critical mass as local entities are asked to bear larger burdens in the 
supervision and treatment of offenders.  
3. For this population and this time period, no statistical correlation can be 
established between property crimes and officer staffing.  While this finding is 
counter-intuitive, other variables not considered in this study could have 
played a greater role than the variables presented.  Other variables, such as the 
relative number of offenders in those communities or the strength of 
cooperation between police and probation departments should be explored.  
Since the data indicates some agencies lost officers while maintaining or 
reducing property crimes, a comprehensive analysis of strategies is 
recommended.  (See Recommendations for Further Study, below.)  
4. Police chiefs strongly believe that realignment had an impact in their 
jurisdictions.  As chiefs, they would not have waited for a statistical 
significance test before addressing a massive reform effort that placed some 
part of 18,000 sophisticated offenders in their communities.  Since almost 
40% of the cities had a decrease in property crime, it is possible strategies 
referenced in this study or others not contemplated had the effect of diffusing, 
deterring, or preventing crime within their realm of influence.  Apart from the  
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short-term benefits of zero-tolerance or high enforcement approaches, the data 
suggests realignment will require law enforcement practitioners to re-examine 
assumptions and conventional approaches.  Additionally, the survey indicated 
the lack of commitment to non-law enforcement partnerships as a viable 
response strategy provides fertile ground for future consideration by police 
chiefs. 
5. Although this study does not quantify the actual start date of the realignment 
response strategies alluded to in the survey, the fact that chiefs promptly 
teamed with allied agencies to address realignment and were likely to 
promptly re-task their best trained officers may be relevant to determining 
why some agencies saw a drop in property crime.    
Implications for Action 
 The analysis and findings of this study echo the clarion call from decades of 
research and the stanchions of American jurisprudence.   
 The pendulum.  Penal policy, consisting of sentencing strictures as well as 
rehabilitative and reform efforts is not effectively enacted as a result of the popular voice 
of the people.  The criminal justice pendulum in California, like the nation, swings hither 
and yon from pole to pole, often the result of popular will.  Making criminal justice 
policy by popular demand, subject to political machinations instead of robust, evidence-
based public policy fact-finding where sentiment is secondary to practical considerations. 
A voter’s version of reform, ranging from three strikes, which many blame for prison 
overcrowding, to Proposition 47, is in the proverbial eye of the beholder.  Passed by a 
vote of the people in November 2014 and made effective immediately, Proposition 47 
classified downward entire swathes of the penal and health and safety codes.  Billed as a  
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way to keep shoplifters and small-time drug users out of state prison, the law made 
possession of a controlled substance a misdemeanor, and significantly changed the way 
property crimes such as burglary and theft were classified.  Three strikes heralded as a 
type of reform as well in its day; a call for justice for innocents like Polly Klaas.  
Measured against the history of prison reform and get-tough measures, Proposition 47 
must seem no less imperfect to the criminologist than three strikes. It therefore appears 
the need for the voices of experts in the field, armed with evidence-based practices in real 
world situations, should figure more prominently when contemplating criminal justice 
legislation.  
 The Constitution and prison overcrowding.  The nation’s highest courts of law 
have made it clear; it is against the founding principles of the United States to assume 
stewardship over convicted criminals and then neglect basic care only the state can 
provide.  The realignment experience has been somewhat unique; the glacial journey of 
Marciano Plata and Ralph Coleman’s bid for basic care became the impetus for the 
highest court to weigh in on the viability of California’s broken prison system.  Although 
the Coleman/Plata cases were almost a generation in the ripening, and prudent voices 
called on governors, legislators, and constituents to act, little was accomplished and the 
slow march through the courts became a tsunami of offenders to probation departments, 
health providers, and county sheriffs and police chiefs at a low point in sworn officer 
staffing.  Relying almost exclusively on get-tough approaches and local jails instead of 
prisons to lower crime is inefficient and inconsistent with procedural justice.  Criminal 
justice reform should promote public safety through the use of proven programs and 
disciplines that reduce recidivism by addressing foundational issues such as dysfunctional 
families and chemical dependency.   
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A perfect storm.  The funding mechanisms provided for in AB 109 and sister 
legislation such as AB 117 were necessarily focused on California’s 58 counties.  This 
was done so that those agencies most affected by realignment’s mandate, the jails, 
probation and health departments, and the courts, would have the wherewithal to house 
and treat the sudden influx of realigned inmates.  Unfortunately, this left out municipal 
law enforcement who serve the majority of the state’s residents, 4,565 fewer peace 
officers on the street in California from 2007 to 2012, and a 19% drop in arrests over the 
same period (CJSC, 2014).  While realignment was not by design a “get out of jail free 
card” for realigned inmates, the displacement effect of moving realigned inmates into 
county facilities resulted in crowded jails and required sheriffs to find alternatives to 
incarceration.  Realigned inmates came into a jail’s front door and somebody got kicked 
out the back door to make room.  In response, police chiefs did what they have always 
done.  They teamed up and tried and fend off the negative effects of the latest wave of 
reform.  They did not wait for funding, more officers or scholarly deductions to point 
them in a particular direction.  They suited up their varsity players and got busy; so busy 
that after the initial wave of 38,000 inmates were realigned to counties California’s prison 
population is creeping upward and are hiring more parole officers.  It must be said that 
along the way, police chiefs may have inadvertently entered the fight minus allies 
possessing valuable experience treating institutionalized offenders, specifically non-law 
enforcement groups like churches, holistic providers, or experts in other non-traditional 
methods.  
 Many law enforcement practitioners might prefer greater attention paid by society 
to keeping dangerous felons behind bars.  Such steps may include restrictions on Superior 
Court judges deemed to be soft on criminals, and tougher requirement enforced for felons  
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seeking parole.  Greater surveillance of perpetrators by probation departments would be 
on the list, along with devising guidelines that would not allow public safety to be 
jeopardized by well-intended state initiatives.  Yet, these and other “wish list” items are 
arguably incompatible with other elements related to the freedoms that most people 
enjoy.  While fully engaging in a holistic effort to reduce prison precursors such as 
chemical dependency, law enforcement should seek partnerships with non-law 
enforcement, non-traditional partners such as churches, veterans groups, and education 
professionals to reduce recidivism. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
1. Since the population consisted of cities of a certain populations with their own police 
departments, it is not fully known what the property crime trends were for cities 
outside the resident population range and serviced by the county sheriff.  Future 
studies could examine similar variables among the 58 counties or among larger or 
smaller cities than represented in this study. 
2. Crime is impacted by many variables, and realignment was only one of many forces 
driving inmate population.  Other variables that could have served to increase or 
decrease crime are not adequately identified or studied.  Future studies could analyze 
variables such as the relative caseload of local probation officers or effectiveness of 
drug dependency treatment by local health departments. 
3. Since some cities apparently managed to maintain or reduce property crime with 
fewer officers than when realignment began, what strategies or influences factored in 
that decline are not known.  Analyzing the demographics, relative number of 
displaced or realigned offenders, community partnership level or relative experience 
of the police chiefs in these cities could be relevant. 
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4. This study did not distinguish other pertinent but meaningful and well-established 
community characteristics such as the level of urban development, unemployment 
levels, education levels, poverty and literacy levels.  Recent events in Ferguson, 
Missouri, among others, point to the importance such factors present to a community.  
Additional study could reveal to what degree these variables influence public safety 
among cities most impacted by realignment. 
5. Police chiefs could have used any number of innovative or groundbreaking strategies 
to respond to realignment, but only four were examined.  A qualitative study 
involving these chiefs or other criminal justice stakeholders could yield strategies or 
innovations not contemplated in the study. 
6. Apart from property crime rates, other measures of criminality such as recidivism are 
being measured in other research, but measuring the relative success of realignment 
as a public safety initiative is not fully developed.  Comparative analysis between 
rates of recidivism and levels of crime reported to the police could shed light on the 
interaction between these important measures of public safety effectiveness. 
Concluding Remarks and Reflections 
 Public Safety Realignment, otherwise known as AB 109, was a defensive action 
to drastically reduce California’s state prison population in accordance with a federal 
mandate.  California’s response to shift the burden of nonviolent, non-serious, non-sex-
related sex offenders from state prison to the counties was implemented on a truncated 
timeline giving local jurisdictions little time to plan and prepare.  
 Offenders were placed back into the community, or released outright due to 
displacement in local jails.  Possibly another offender stepped out to freedom, acting 
vicariously as a realigned stand-in, due to overcrowding that migrated from prisons to  
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jails.  Further, offenders on supervision had a much smaller window to avoid legal 
entanglements by being subject to search without probable cause for as little as six 
months.  
 Despite realignment’s shortcomings, it has helped place the state in a firmer 
financial footing, and brought California much closer to the court’s mandate limiting 
overcrowding to 137% capacity.  It has also greatly enhanced cooperation among allied 
agencies.  Some banded together out of survival but nonetheless forged effective 
partnerships.  No study is likely to eradicate crime, and how those who break the law 
should be treated will always remain controversial.  What is important is not that all of 
the answers are found, but that people of good will continue to ask the questions.    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
102 
 
  REFERENCES 
2011 Realignment Legislation Addressing Public Safety, AB 109.  (2011).  Ch. 15. 
Apel, R.  (2013).  Sanctions, perceptions, and crime: implications for criminal deterrence. 
Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 29(1), 67-101.  doi: 10.1007/s10940-012-
9170-1 
Ardaiz, J.A.  (2000).  California's three strikes law: history, expectations, consequences. 
McGeorge Law Review, 32(1).  
Austin, J., Clark, J., Hardyman P., & Henry, D.A.  (1999).  Three strikes and you’re out: 
the implementation and impact of strike laws.  Punishment & Society, 1, 131. doi: 
10.1177/14624749922227757. 
Avdija, A.S. & Giever, D.M.  (2012).  Examining the effect of selected demographic 
characteristics on crime-reporting behavior.  Journal of Alternative Perspectives 
in Social Sciences, 4(4), 790-821. 
Bachmann, R.D. & Schutt, R.K. (2013). The Practice of Research in Criminology and 
Criminal Justice (5th ed). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.   
Ball, W.D.  (2013).  Tough on crime (on the state’s dime): how violent crime does not 
drive California counties’ incarceration rates—and why it should.  Georgia State 
University Law Review, 28(4). Retrieved from http://scholarworks.gsu. 
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2695&context=gsulr 
Bardham, A. & Walker, R.  (2011).   California shrugged: fountainhead of the Great 
Recession.  Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 005. 
Beck, A. R. (2001). Recidivism: A fruit salad concept in the criminal justice world. 
Retrieved from Justice Concepts, http://www.justiceconcepts.com/recidivism.pdf 
 
    
 
 
 
 
103 
 
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of Political 
Economy 76, 169-217. 
Bhati, A. (2007). Estimating the number of crimes averted by incapacitation: an 
information theoretic approach. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 23(4), 355-
375.  doi:10.1007/s10940-007-9034-2 
Bishara, A., & Hittner, J. (2012). Testing the Significance of a Correlation with 
Nonnormal Data: Comparison of Pearson, Spearman, Transformation, and 
Resampling Approaches. Psychological Methods, 17(3), 399-417. 
Blumstein, A. & Wallman, J. (2006). The crime drop and beyond. Annual Review of Law 
and Social Science, 2, 125-146. 
Board of State and Community Corrections (2014). 2011 Public Safety Realignment Act: 
second annual report on the implementation of Community Corrections 
Partnership Plans. Retrieved from http://www.bscc.ca.gov/downloads/2011%20 
Public%20Safety%20Realignment%20Act%20%20Second%20Annual%20Repor
t%20on%20the%20Implementation %20of%20Community%20Correcti.pdf 
Board of State and Community Corrections (2014a). BSCC Recidivism Definition. 
Retrieved from http://www.bscc.ca.gov/downloads/Recidivism%20 
Defintion%20Press%20Release.pdf 
Brown, B. & Jolivette, G. (2005). A primer: three strikes - the impact after more than a 
decade. Legislative Analyst’s Office. Retrieved from http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/ 
3_strikes/3_strikes_102005.htm  
Brown v. Plata. (2011). 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923–24. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2009). Retrieved from http://www.bjs.gov/ucrdata 
 /offenses.cfm 
    
 
 
 
 
104 
 
Cadora, E. (2014). Civic lessons: how certain schemes to end mass incarcerations can 
fail. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
651(277) doi: 10.1177/0002716213503786 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (2013). Realignment report: 
an examination of offenders released from state prison in the first year of public 
safety realignment. Retrieved from http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/AdultResearch_ 
Branch/Research_Documents/Realignment_1_Year_Report_12-23-13.pdf 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (2013). 2013 Outcome 
Evaluation Report. Retrieved from http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult_Research 
_Branch/Research_Documents/Outcome_Evaluation_Report_2013.pdf 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (2014). Non Revocable Parole: 
Penal Code § 3000.03. Retrieved from http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Parole/ 
Non_Revocable_Parole/pdf/Non-Revocable_Parole_FAQs.pdf 
California Department of Finance. (2014). E-1 Population Estimates for Cities, Counties, 
and the State — January 1, 2012 and 2013. Retrieved from http://www.dof. 
ca.gov/research/demographic/reports/estimates/e-1/view.php  
Cantor, D., & Lynch, J. P. (2000). Self-report surveys as measures of crime and criminal 
victimization. Criminal justice, 4, 85-138. 
Carson, E.A. & Golinelli, D. (2013). Prisoners in 2012; trends in admissions and 
releases, 1991–2012. U.S.D.O.J., Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics; NCJ 243920.   
Catalano, S. M. (2006). The measurement of crime: victim reporting and police 
recording. New York: Scholarly Publications.  
 
    
 
 
 
 
105 
 
Caulkins, J. P. (2001). How large should the strike zone be in ‘three strikes and you’re 
out’ sentencing laws? Journal of Quantitative Criminology,17(4), 227–246. 
Chalfin, A. J. (2013). Essays on the Economics of Crime.  UC Berkeley: Public Policy. 
Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/52m4r1rf 
Chambliss, W. J. (2001). Power, Politics, and Crime. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press. 
Clear, T. R., & Frost, N. (2014). The punishment imperative: the rise and failure of mass 
incarceration in America. New York: New York University Press. 
Chen, E.Y. (2008). Impacts of “Three Strikes and You’re Out” on crime trends in 
California and throughout the United States.  Journal of Contemporary Criminal 
Justice. doi: 10.1177/1043986208319456 24: 345-370. 
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger. (2009).  No. CIV S-90-0520, 2009 WL 2430820, at *12 
(E.D. Cal.). 
Coleman v. Wilson. (1995). 912 F.Supp. 1282, 1316 (E.D.Cal.). 
Cox, J. & Cox, K.B. (2008). Your opinion please.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing. 
Criminal Justice Statistics Center (2014). Criminal Justice Profiles, criminal justice full-
time personnel. Retrieved from https://oag.ca.gov/crime/cjsc/criminal-justice-
profiles 
Cullen, F.T., Fisher, B.S., & Applegate, B.K. (2000).  Public opinion about punishment 
and corrections. Crime and Justice, 27. 
D'Alessio, S.,J., & Stolzenberg, L. (1998).  Crime, arrests, and pretrial jail incarceration: 
An examination of the deterrence thesis. Criminology, 36(4), 735-761. 
Dansky, K. (2008). Understanding California sentencing. University of San Francisco 
Law Review, 43, 45-86. 
    
 
 
 
 
106 
 
Davidson, M. & Ward, K. (2014). Picking up the pieces’; austerity urbanism, California 
and fiscal crisis. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society,7(1), 81-
97. 
Davis, J.B. (2006). The distribution of property crime and police arrest rates across Los 
Angeles neighborhoods.  Western Criminology Review 7(3), 7–26. 
Davis, R. C., & Henderson, N.J. (2003). Willingness to report crimes: the role of ethnic 
group membership and community efficacy. Crime & Delinquency 49, 564. 
D’Elia, C. (2010). The politics of public safety reform in California. Federal Sentencing 
Reporter, 22(3), 144-147. 
Di Tella, R., & Schargrodsky, E. (2004). Do police reduce crime? Estimates using the 
allocation of police forces after a terrorist attack. American Economic Review, 
94(1), 115-133. 
Douglas, J., Burgess, A.W., Burgess, A.G., & Ressler, R.K. (2013). Crime classification 
manual: a standard system for investigating and classifying violent crimes. 
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and Sons Publishing. 
Ducart, A.M. (2013). Go directly to jail: how misaligned subsidies undermine 
California's prisoner realignment goals and what is possible to maximize the law's 
potential. McGeorge Law Review, 44, 481-513. 
Dugan, A. (2013). More say crime is serious problem in U.S. than locally. Gallup Poll 
Briefing, 1930224X, 11/1/2013.  
Duker, M. A., & Malsch, M. M. (2012). Incapacitation : Trends and New Perspectives. 
Farnham, MD: Ashgate Press. 
 
    
 
 
 
 
107 
 
Eck, J.E., & Maguire, E.R. (2006). “Have changes in policing reduced violent crime? An 
assessment of the evidence”, 207-265 in The crime drop in America, edited by A. 
Blumstein and J. Wallman. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Evans, W.N. & Owens, E.G. (2007) Cops and crime. Journal of Public Economics, 91(2), 
181-201. 
Ewing v. California. (2003). 538 U.S. 11, 26-27  
Fawcett, J. & Garity, J. (2009). Evaluating research for evidence-based nursing. 
Philadelphia, PA: F. A. Davis Publishing. 
Fazzi, S.D. (2013). A primer on the 2011 corrections realignment: why California placed 
felons under county control. McGeorge Law Review. 44, 423 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (2012). Crime in the United States 2012. Retrieved from 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-
012/tables/1tabledatadecoverviewpdf/table_1_crime_in_the_united_states_by_vol
ume_and_rate_per_100000_inhabitants_1993-2012.xls 
Flynn, K. (2013). Putting teeth into AB 109: why California’s historic public safety 
realignment act should require reentry programming. Golden Gate University Law 
Review, 43(3), 525-557. 
Garland, D. (2001). Culture of control; crime and social disorder in contemporary 
society. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Gartner, R., Doob, A., & Zimring, F. (2011). The past as prologue? Decarceration in 
California then and now. Criminology & Public Policy, 10(2), 291-325. 
Gascón, G., & Foglesong, T. S. (2010). Making policing more affordable: managing 
costs and measuring value in policing. Harvard Kennedy School Program in 
 
    
 
 
 
 
108 
 
 Criminal Justice Policy and Management ; Washington, DC : U.S. Dept. of 
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. 
Geis, G. (2012). Newspapers, criminologists, and crime statistics. Crime, Law & Social 
Change.58, 131-138. 
Geis, G.C., Mobley, A., & Shichor, D. (1999). Private prisons, criminological research, 
and conflict of interest: a case study. Crime and Delinquency. 45, 372. 
Gilmore, R.W. (2007). Golden gulag: prisons, surplus, crisis, and opposition in 
globalizing California.  Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Goudriaan, H. (2006). Reporting crime: effects of social context on the decision of victims 
to notify the police. Veenendaal, NL: Universal Publishing.  
Grattet, R. & Hayes, J. (2013). California’s changing prison population. Public policy 
Institute of California. Retrieved from http://www.ppic.org/main/ 
publication_show.asp?i=702 
Guffey, J.E., Larson, J.G. & Kelso, C. (2010). Police officer staffing: analyzing the 
commonly held belief that more cops equals less crime. Professional Issues in 
Criminal Justice, 5(2 & 3), 29-41. 
Haney, C. (2003). Mental health issues in long-term solitary and “supermax” 
confinement. Crime & Delinquency, 49(1), 124-156. 
Harris, K. D. (2014). The Attorney General’s proposal to define and evaluate recidivism. 
Retrieved from: _7-25-14_AG_s_Proposal_to_Define_and_Measure_ 
Recidivism.pdf 
Heaton, P. (2010). Hidden in plain sight what cost-of-crime research can tell us about 
investing in police. The Rand Corporation. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org 
/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP279.pdf 
    
 
 
 
 
109 
 
Heyer, C.F. (2012). Comparing the strike zones of "Three Strikes and You're Out" laws 
for California and Georgia, the nation's two heaviest hitters. Suffolk University 
Law Review. 45, 1217.  
Hill, C., Stevens, K.R., & Pearl, N. (2013). Jail population trends; measuring 
realignment at the two year mark. Panel presentation conducted at the 78th semi-
annual meeting of the Association of Criminal Justice Research (California). 
Retrieved from http://public.tableausoftware.com/profile/#!/vizhome/ACJR 
October2013/ACJROctober2013  
Jancic, M. (1998). Does correctional education have an effect on recidivism? Journal of 
Correctional Education, 49(4), 152-161. 
Jargowsky, P.A. & Park, Y. (2009). Cause or consequence? Suburbanization and crime in 
U.S. metropolitan areas. Crime & Delinquency, 55(1), 28-50. 
Jett, K. & Hancock, J. (2013). Realignment in the counties. Federal Sentencing Reporter, 
25(4), 236-240. 
Jones, N. (2012). Realignment: California's criminal justice experiment. UC Berkeley 
Graduate School of Journalism. Retrieved from http://escholarship.org/uc 
/item/7xz4k1zk 
 Johnson, R. & Raphael, S. (2012).  How much crime reduction does the marginal 
prisoner buy? Journal of Law and Economics, 55(2), 275-310. 
Justice Center; the Council for State Governments. (2013). The impact of probation and 
parole populations on arrests in four California cities. 
Kieso, D.W. (2005). Unjust sentencing and the California three strikes law. New York: 
LFB Scholarly Publications.  
 
    
 
 
 
 
110 
 
Kiewtet, D.R. & McCubbins, M.D. (2014) State and local government finance: the New 
Fiscal Ice Age. Annual Review of Political Science, 17, 105-122. 
Kilgour, J.G. (2011).  California's public sector pension plans in perspective. 
Compensation & Benefits Review. 43(3), 153 –163. 
King, J. (2012). It’s all political, but public policy is irrational. Pepperdine Policy 
Review, 5(7). 
Kinkade, P., Leone, M., & Semond, S. (1995). The consequences of jail crowding. Crime 
& Delinquency, 41,150. doi: 10.1177/0011128795041001008 
Kleck, G. & Barnes, J.C. (2010). Do police lead to more crime deterrence? Crime and 
Delinquency. doi: 10.1177/0011128710382263 
Kleinbaum, D., Kupper, L., Nizam, A., & Rosenberg, E.S. (2008). Applied regression 
analysis and other multivariable methods (5th ed.). Independence, KY: Cengage 
Learning.  
Kovandzic, T. V. (2001). The impact of Florida’s habitual offender law on crime. 
Criminology, 39(1), 179-203. 
Lauritsen, J. L., Heimer, K., & Lynch, J. P. (2009). Trends in the gender gap in violent 
offending: new evidence from the national crime victimization survey. 
Criminology,47(2), 361-399. 
Lauritsen, J.L., Rezey, M.L., & Heimer, K. (2014). Violence and economic conditions in 
the United States, 1973-2011: gender, race, and ethnicity patterns in the National 
Crime Victimization Survey. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30, 7-
28. 
Lawrence, S. (2013). Managing jail populations to enhance public safety: assessing and 
managing risk in the post-realignment era. Stanford Criminal Justice Center.  
    
 
 
 
 
111 
 
Retrieved from https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/child-
page/440504/doc/slspublic/Paper%20on%20jail%20mgmt%20July%202013.pdf 
Leachman, M., Williams, E., & Johnson, N. (2011).  New fiscal year brings further 
budget cuts to most states, slowing economic recovery. Center for Budget and 
Policy Priorities. Retrieved from http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-28-11sfp.pdf 
Levitt, S. D. (1998). The relationship between crime reporting and police: implications 
for the use of Uniform Crime Reports. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 1, 
61. 
Levitt, S.D. (2004). Understanding why crime fell in the 1990s: four factors that explain 
the decline and six that do not. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18, 163–90. 
Liedka, R.V., Piehl, A.M., & Useem, B. (2006). The crime control effect of incarceration; 
does scale matter? Criminology & Public Policy. Vol. 5, Issue 2, p. 245–276. Doi 
10.1111/j.1745-9133.2006.00376.x 
Little Hoover Commission (2007). Letter to Governor Schwarzenegger and the state 
legislature. Retrieved from http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhc/185/Report185.pdf 
Little Hoover Commission (2011). Letter to Governor Brown and the legislature on 
community corrections. Retrieved from http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/207/Report 
207letter.pdf 
Little Hoover Commission (2013). Letter to Governor Brown and the legislature on bail 
and pre-trial services. Retrieved from http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/216/ 
Report216.pdf 
Lofstrom, M. & Rafael, S. (2013). Public safety realignment and crime rates in 
California. Public Policy Institute of California. Retrieved from http://www. 
ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_1213MLR.pdf 
    
 
 
 
 
112 
 
Loury, G.C. (2014). Detention, democracy, and inequality in a divided society. Annals of 
the American Academy of Political & Social Science, 651(1), 178-182. 
Loury, G.C. (2007). Why are so many Americans in prison? Boston Review, 32(4), 7-10. 
Lynch, M. (2013). Realigning research: a proposed (partial) agenda for sociolegal 
scholars. Federal Sentencing Reporter, 25(4), 254-259.  
Males, M., Macallair, D., & Corcoran, M.D. (2006). Testing incapacitation theory: 
youth crime and incarceration in California. Center On Juvenile And Criminal 
Justice. 
Males, M. & Buchen, L. (2013). California’s urban crime increase in 2012: is 
“realignment” to blame? Research Brief: Center on Juvenile and Criminal 
Justice. Retrieved from http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/ 
california_urban_crime_increase_2012.pdf 
Males, M. & Goldstein, B, (2014). California’s 58 crime rates: realignment and crime in 
2012. Research Report: Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice. Retrieved from 
http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/CJCJ_2014_Realignment_Report.pdf 
Marvell, T. A., & Moody, C. E. (1996). Specification problems, police levels, and crime 
rates. Criminology, 34(4), 609-646. Retrieved from ttp://search.proquest.com/doc 
view/220703566?accountid=10051 
Maxfield, M.G. & Babbie, E. (2008). Research methods for criminal justice and 
criminology (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thompson Higher Education.  
McCarty, W.P., Ren, L., & Zhao, J.S. (2009). Determinants of police strength in large US 
cities during the 1990s: a fixed effects panel analysis. Crime and Delinquency, 58, 
397. doi: 10.1177/0011128709336942 
 
    
 
 
 
 
113 
 
McMillan, J.H. & Schumacher, S. (2010). Research in education; evidence-based inquiry 
(7th ed.). New York: Pearson Press.  
Merton, R. K. (1938). Social structure and anomie. American Sociological Review, 3, 
672-682. 
Misczynski, D. (2011). Rethinking the state-local relationship: corrections. Public Policy 
Institute of California. 
Mulhausen, D.B. (2001). Do Community Oriented Policing Services Grants Affect 
Violent Crime Rates? Heritage Foundation Center for Data Analysis Report 
CDA01-05. Retrieved from http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2001/05/do-
cops-grants-affect-violent-crime-rates 
Nagin, D. (2013). “Deterrence in the 21st Century,” in Crime and Justice in America: 
1975-2025 (ed. Michael Tonry, University of Chicago Press). 
National Research Council. (2008). Understanding crime trends: workshop report. 
Washington, DC: National Academies Press. 
Nolan, J.J., Haas, S.M., & Napier, J.S. (2011). Estimating the impact of classification 
error on the statistical accuracy of the Uniform Crime Report. Journal of 
Quantitative Criminology, 27(4), 497-519. doi: 10.1007/s10940-011-9135-9 
Noll, D. (2012). Building a new identity: race, gangs, and violence in California prisons. 
University of Miami Law Review, 66(3), 847-878. 
O Brien, R.M. (1996). Police productivity and crime rates: 1973-1992. Criminology, 
34(2), 183. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/ 
220708661?accountid=10051 
 
    
 
 
 
 
114 
 
Office of the Inspector General. (2011). Special report: California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation’s implementation of the Non-Revocable Parole 
Program. Retrieved from http://www.oig.ca.gov/media/reports/ 
ARCHIVE/BOI/Special%20Report%20California%20Department%20of%20Corr
ections%20and%20Rehabilitations%20Implementation%20of%20the%20Non-
Revocable%20Parole%20Program.pdf 
Patten, M.L. (2009). Understanding research methods; an overview of the essentials (7th 
ed.). Glendale, CA: Pyrczak Publishing.  
Penal Code § 22022.53. (2014). Retrieved from http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/displaycode?section =pen&group=12001-13000&file=12001-12022.95 
Pennypacker, P.H. & Thompson, A. (2103). Realignment: a view from the trenches.  
Santa Clara Law Review, 53, 991. 
Petersilia, J. (2008). Influencing public policy: an embedded criminologist reflects on 
California prison reform. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 4, 335. 
Petersilia, J. (2009). A Retrospective view of corrections reform in the Schwarzenegger 
Administration. Federal Sentencing Reporter, 22(3), 148–153. doi: 
10.1525/fsr.2010.22.3.148 
Petersilia, J. (2011). Beyond the prison bubble. The Wilson Quarterly, winter 2011. 
Retrieved from http://archive.wilsonquarterly.com/essays/beyond-prison-bubble 
Petersilia, J. (2013). Voices from the field: how California stakeholders view public 
safety realignment. Stanford Criminal Justice Center. Retrieved from 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/child-
page/183091/doc/slspublic/SCJC%20Voices-full-report.pdf 
    
 
 
 
 
115 
 
 Petersilia, J. & Lin, J. (2012). Follow the money: how California counties are spending 
their public safety realignment funds. Stanford Criminal Justice Center. Retrieved 
from http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/child-page/183091/ 
doc/slspublic/Money%20Full%20Report%2012%2011%2013.pdf 
Pettit, B. & Western, B. (2004). Mass imprisonment and the life course: race and class 
inequality in U.S incarceration. American Sociological Review, 69, 151-169. 
Pew Charitable Trusts. (2012). The local squeeze: falling revenues and growing demand 
for services challenge cities, counties, and school districts. Washington, DC. 
Retrieved from http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/0001 
/01/01/the-local-squeeze 
Plata v. Schwarzenegger (2005).  WL 2932253 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005). 
Plata v. Schwarzenegger. (2007). No. C01-1351 TEH.  
Pontell, H.N., & Welsh, W.N. (1994).  Incarceration as a deviant form of social control: 
jail overcrowding in California. Crime & Delinquency, 40, 18. 
Rappaport, A. (2013). Realigning California corrections. Federal Sentencing Reporter, 
25(4), 207-216. 
Rappaport, A. & Dansky, K. (2010). State of emergency: California's correctional crisis. 
Federal Sentencing Reporter, 22, 133-143. 
Rose, D. R., & Clear, T. R. (1998). Incarceration, social capital, and crime: Implications 
for social disorganization theory. Criminology, 36, 441-480. 
Rosenfeld, R. (2013). Economics and Youth Violence : Crime, Disadvantage, and 
Community. New York: NYU Press. 
Rubin, A. & Rubin, E.R. (2010). Research Methods for Social Work. Independence, KY: 
Cengage Learning.  
 
    
 
 
 
 
116 
 
Rushford, M. (2012). Rationalizing realignment; a perspective on California's return to 
alternative sentencing. Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.  
Salins, L. & Simpson, S. (2013). Efforts to fix a broken system: Brown V. Plata and the 
prison overcrowding epidemic. Loyola University Chicago Law Journal. 44, 
1153. 
Scheidegger, K.S. (2013). The California crime spike; an analysis of the preliminary 
2012 data. Criminal Justice Legal Foundation. Retrieved from 
http://www.cjlf.org/publications/CalCrime2012Prelim.pdf 
Schlanger, M. (2012). Plata v. Brown and realignment: jails, prisons, courts, and politics. 
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 48(1) 165-215. 
Schlesinger, T. (2011). The failure of race neutral policies: how mandatory terms and 
sentencing enhancements contribute to mass racialized incarceration. Crime & 
Delinquency, 57(1), 56-81. 
Schultz, D. (2000). No joy in Mudville tonight: the impact of three strikes laws on state 
and federal corrections policy, resources, and crime control. Cornell Journal of 
Law and Public Policy, 9, 557. 
Schwarzenegger, A. (2006). Prison overcrowding state of emergency proclamation. 
Retrieved from http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=4278 
Sharp, E.B. (2006). Policing urban America: a new look at the politics of agency size. 
Social Science Quarterly. 87(2). 
Shinbein, I. M. (1996). 'Three-strikes and you're out': a good political slogan to reduce 
crime, but a failure in its application. New England Journal on Criminal and Civil 
Confinement, 22175. 
 
    
 
 
 
 
117 
 
Siegel, S. (1988). Nonparametric statistics for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). London: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Sillen, R. (2006) Testimony to the Commission by the court appointed receiver, Plata v. 
Schwarzenegger, November 16, 2006. Retrieved from http://www.lhc.ca.gov 
/studies/185/Report185.pdf 
Simon, J. (2013). The Return of the Medical Model: Disease and the Meaning of 
Imprisonment from John Howard to Brown v. Plata. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil 
Liberties Law Review, 48(2), 217-256. 
Skoler, D.L. (1971). There's more to crime control than the "get-tough" approach. Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 397, 28-39. 
Specter, D. (2010). Everything revolves around overcrowding: the state of California’s 
prisons. Federal Sentencing Reporter, 22(3), 194-199. 
Spencer, J. & Petersilia, J. (2013). Voices from the field: California victims’ rights in a 
post-realignment world. Federal Sentencing Reporter, 25(4), 226–232. doi: 
10.1525/fsr.2013.25.4.226 
Stucky, T.D. (2005). Urban politics, crime rates, and police strength. New York: LFB 
Scholarly Publishing.  
Subramanian, R. & Delaney, R. (2014). Playbook for change? States reconsidering 
mandatory sentences. Federal Sentencing Reporter, 26(3). 
Sutton, J. R. (2013). Symbol and Substance: Effects of California's Three Strikes Law on 
Felony Sentencing. Law & Society Review, 47(1), 37-72.  
Tafoya, S., Grattet, R., & Bird, M. (2013). Corrections realignment and  
data collection in California. Public Policy Institute of California. Retrieved from 
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_414STR.pdf 
 
    
 
 
 
 
118 
 
Taylor, J. (2001). California’s Proposition 21: A Case of Juvenile Injustice. Southern 
California Law Review, 75, 987–89. 
Taylor, M. (2012). The 2012-13 budget: refocusing CDCR after the 2011 realignment. 
Legislative Analyst’s Office. Retrieved from http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/ 
2012/crim_justice/cdcr-022312.pdf  
Telep, C. W., & Weisburd, D. (2012). What is known about the effectiveness of police practices 
in reducing crime and disorder? Police Quarterly, 15, 331-357. 
Tonry, M. (2009). The mostly unintended effects of mandatory penalties: two centuries 
of consistent findings. Crime and Justice. 38.  
Turner, S., Braithwaite, H., Tatar, J., Omori, M., & Kearney, L. (2011). The impact of the 
California parole supervision and reintegration model pilot implementation on 
parole agent attitudes. Center for Evidence Based Corrections, University of 
California, Irvine. 
U.S Department of Justice. (1994). Violent Crime Control and Law enforcement Act of 
1994 fact sheet. Retrieved from https://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/billfs.txt 
U.S. Department of Justice. (2012). Uniform Crime Report. Retrieved from 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/crimestats 
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing (2011). The impact 
of the economic downturn on American police agencies. Retrieved from 
http://www.cops. usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/e101113406 
_Economic%20Impact.pdf 
U.S. Government Printing Office. (1993). The Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994. Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
103hr3355enr/pdf/BILLS-103hr3355enr.pdf  
    
 
 
 
 
119 
 
Vitiello, M. (2013). Still between a rock and a hard place: sentencing reform in 
California. Federal Sentencing Reporter, 25(1), 233-235.   
Vitello, M. (1997). Three strikes; can we return to rationality? Journal of Criminal Law 
& Criminology, 87, 395. 
Walsh, J.E. (2007). Three strikes laws. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
Waltz, C.F., Strickland, O.L., & Lenz, E.R. (2005). Measurement in nursing and health 
research (3rd ed.) New York: Springer Publishing Co. 
Warner, M.E. & Clifton, J. (2014). Marketisation, public services and the city: the 
potential for Polanyian counter movements. Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society 7, 45–61. 
Warren, R. K. (2009). Probation Reform in California: Senate Bill 678. Federal 
Sentencing Reporter, 22(3), 186-193. doi 10:1525/fsr.2010.22.3.186 
Welfare and Institutions Code § 707. (1994).  
Weisberg, R. (2014). Meanings and measures of recidivism. Southern California Law 
Review, 87(3), 785. 
Weisburd, D., & Telep, C. W. (2014). Hot Spots Policing: What We Know and What We 
Need to Know. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30(2), 200-220. 
doi:10.1177/1043986214525083 
Wilson, J. Q., & Boland, B. (1978). The effect of police on crime. Law and Society  
Review, 12, 367-390. 
Wilson, J. Q. and G. L. Kelling (1982) Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety. Atlantic Monthly. Retrieved from http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/pdf/_atlantic_monthly-broken_windows.pdf  
  
    
 
 
 
 
120 
 
Wilson, J.M. & Weiss, A. (2014). Police staffing allocation and managing workload 
demand: a critical assessment of existing practices. Policing, 8(2), 96-108. 
Wilson, J.M. & Heinonen, J.A. (2011). Advancing a police science: implications from a 
national survey of police staffing. Police Quarterly,14,277. doi: 
10.1177/1098611111414001 
Wilson, J.M. & Weiss, A. (2012). A performance based approach to police staffing and 
allocation. US Dept. of Justice COPS Office/ Michigan State University. 
Retrieved from http://aapp.msu.edu/sites/default/files/file 
/041218461_Performance_Based_Approach_Police_Staffing_FINAL100112.pdf 
Withrow, B. L., & Dailey, J. (2012). Racial profiling litigation: current status and 
emerging controversies. Journal Of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 28(2), 122-
145. doi:10.1177/1043986211425731 
Wolff, K. T., Cochran, J. C., & Baumer, E. P. (2014). Reevaluating foreclosure effects on 
crime during the “Great Recession”. Journal Of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 
30(1), 41-69. doi:10.1177/1043986213509025 
Wynd, C.A., Schmidt, B., & Schaefer, M.A. (2003). Two quantitative approaches for 
estimating content validity. Western Journal of Nursing Research, 25, 
508–518. 
Worrall, J.L. & Kovandzic, T.V. (2010). Police levels and crime rates: an instrumental 
variables approach.  Social Science Research, 39, 506–516. 
Zhang, S.X., Roberts, R.E.L., & Callanan, V.J. (2006). Preventing parolees from return to 
prison-Community-based corrections on a statewide scale.  Crime and 
Delinquency, 52(4), 551-571. 
    
 
 
 
 
121 
 
Zhang, S.X., Roberts, R.E.L., & McCollister, K.E. (2009). Therapeutic community in a 
California prison: treatment outcomes after 5 years. Crime & Delinquency, 57(1), 
82-101. 
Zhao, J., & Thurman, Q. (2004). Funding community policing to reduce crime: have 
COPS grants made a difference from 1994 to 2000. Report Submitted to the 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. 
Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-05-
699R/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-05-699R.htm1994 to 2000  
Zimring, F.E., Hawkins, G., & Kamin, S. (2001). Punishment and democracy: a hard 
look at three strikes overblown promises. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Zimring, F.E. & Hawkins, G. (1991). The scale of imprisonment. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Zimring, F. E., & Hawkins, G. (1995). Incapacitation : penal confinement and the 
restraint of crime. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
122 
 
APPENDIX A 
Survey Question #1: Research indicates property crimes increased in some California 
cities from 2010 to 2012.  Regarding property crime in your jurisdiction from 
2010 to 2012, to what extent were the following factors significant with respect to 
increases in property crime? 
 
1) AB 109 California’s Public Safety Realignment law 
Not at all                         Slightly                                     Highly 
significant     significant                    Significant            significant 
       1----------------------------2-----------------------------3-------------------------------4 
 
2)   The current economic recession 
 
Not at all    Slightly                                     Highly 
significant    significant                    Significant              significant 
       1---------------------------2------------------------------3------------------------------4 
 
3)  My department’s sworn officer staffing levels 
 
Not at all   Slightly                                                             Highly 
significant   significant                    Significant               significant 
       1-------------------------------2---------------------------3----------------------------4 
 
4)   County or local jail overcrowding  
 
Not at all   Slightly                                                             Highly 
significant       significant                    Significant                     significant 
       1-------------------------------2--------------------------3-----------------------------4 
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Survey Question #2: In response to AB 109 California’s Public Safety Realignment law, 
some police departments enacted certain strategies to address changes brought 
about by realignment.  Please rate the extent that you have or are considering 
implementing these strategies in response to realignment: 
 
1)  Increased partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies 
 
Not       Considered                     Partially                             Fully 
considered                      not yet begun                 implemented               implemented 
       1-------------------------------2----------------------------3---------------------------4 
 
2)  Sought alternative funding solutions such as grants 
 
Not                                   Considered                     Partially                Fully   
considered                     not yet begun                implemented         implemented 
       1-------------------------------2----------------------------3---------------------------4 
 
3)  Created specialized units or reoriented existing specialized units  
Not                                   Considered                     Partially                Fully   
considered                     not yet begun                implemented         implemented 
       1-------------------------------2----------------------------3---------------------------4 
 
4)  Engaged with non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned 
probationers 
Not                                   Considered                     Partially                Fully   
considered                     not yet begun                implemented         implemented 
       1-------------------------------2----------------------------3---------------------------4 
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Survey Question #3: In response to AB 109, California’s Public Safety Realignment law, 
some agencies responded by enacting certain strategies to address changes 
brought about by realignment.  How effective would you rate the following 
strategies in responding to realignment? 
 
1) Increased partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies 
Not                                    Somewhat                Effective                     Significantly  
at all effective             effective              effective 
       1-----------------------------------2-----------------------3----------------------------4 
 
2) Sought alternative funding solutions such as grants 
Not                                        Somewhat                    Effective                      Significantly  
at all effective                        effective                                                             effective 
       1----------------------------------2-----------------------3----------------------------4 
 
3) Created specialized units or reoriented existing specialized units  
Not                                         Somewhat                  Effective                      Significantly  
at all effective                          effective                                                          effective 
       1----------------------------------2-----------------------3----------------------------4 
 
4) Engaged with non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned 
probationers 
Not                                         Somewhat                  Effective                       Significantly  
at all effective                         effective                                                            effective 
       1----------------------------------2-----------------------3----------------------------4  
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APPENDIX C 
City Population Property 
Crime 
Sworn Officer 
Staffing 
Atascadero 28,310 620 26 
Atwater 28,168 1128 36 
Azusa 46,361 1136 59 
Banning 29,603 546 33 
Beaumont 36,877 781 56 
Bell 35,477 601 32 
Benicia 26,997 471 36 
Beverly 
Hills 
34,109 
985 127 
Brea 39,282 1471 97 
Burlingame 28,806 702 36 
Calexico 38,572 1429 40 
Campbell 39,349 1451 40 
Ceres 45,417 1946 49 
Claremont 34,926 877 35 
Covina 47,796 1643 55 
Culver City 38,883 1638 99 
Cypress 47,802 787 56 
Danville 42,039 531 31 
Desert Hot 
Springs 
25,938 
1,380 25 
East Palo 
Alto 
28,155 
846 37 
El Centro 42,598 2408 52 
Eureka 27,191 1576 48 
Foster City 30,567 416 35 
Gilroy 48,821 1555 58 
Hollister 34,928 889 25 
La Verne 31,063 643 40 
Lincoln 42,819 447 31 
Lompoc 42,434 932 50 
Los Altos 28,976 233 30 
Los Banos 35,972 1050 38 
Los Gatos 29,413 576 42 
Manhattan 
Beach 
35,135 
839 65 
Martinez 35,824 847 39 
Menlo Park 32,026 645 48 
Monrovia 36,590 1080 48 
Montclair 36,664 1752 50 
Monterey 27,810 1183 50 
Morgan Hill 37,882 642 36 
Newark 42,573 1428 51 
Oakley 35,432 483 30 
Pacifica 37,234 760 36 
Palm 
Springs 
44,552 
1973 88 
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Paradise 26,218 546 24 
Paso Robles 29,793 1006 32 
Pleasant 
Hill 
33,152 
1407 43 
Rohnert 
Park 
40,971 
836 60 
San Bruno 41,114 909 44 
San Gabriel 39,718 566 53 
San Luis 
Obispo 
45,119 
1686 57 
San Pablo 29,139 1369 52 
Santa Paula 29,321 517 30 
Seaside 33,025 592 41 
Soledad 25,738 331 21 
South 
Pasadena 
25,619 
423 35 
Suisun City 28,111 665 25 
West 
Sacramento 
48,744 
1345 67 
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APPENDIX D 
City Population Property 
Crime 
Sworn Officer 
Staffing 
Atascadero 28,310 658 26 
Atwater 28,168 1,400 30 
Azusa 46,361 1,204 60 
Banning 29,603 708 27 
Beaumont 36,877 1,342 51 
Bell 35,477 662 27 
Benicia 26,997 390 34 
Beverly Hills 34,109 1,081 111 
Brea 39,282 1,292 85 
Burlingame 28,806 707 36 
Calexico 38,572 1,538 38 
Campbell 39,349 1,649 44 
Ceres 45,417 1,940 52 
Claremont 34,926 901 37 
Covina 47,796 1,651 56 
Culver City 38,883 1,760 101 
Cypress 47,802 1,018 55 
Danville 42,039 442 30 
Desert Hot 
Springs 
25,938 
1,157 29 
East Palo 
Alto 
28,155 
587 33 
El Centro 42,598 2,477 50 
Eureka 27,191 1,956 50 
Foster City 30,567 345 35 
Gilroy 48,821 1,788 58 
Hollister 34,928 724 22 
La Verne 31,063 823 40 
Lincoln 42,819 506 19 
Lompoc 42,434 1,166 48 
Los Altos 28,976 299 30 
Los Banos 35,972 1,210 36 
Los Gatos 29,413 629 39 
Manhattan 
Beach 
35,135 
855 59 
Martinez 35,824 930 34 
Menlo Park 32,026 625 47 
Monrovia 36,590 948 46 
Montclair 36,664 1,703 50 
Monterey 27,810 1,016 46 
Morgan Hill 37,882 695 35 
Newark 42,573 1,349 51 
Oakley 35,432 477 28 
Pacifica 37,234 578 33 
Palm Springs 44,552 2,232 87 
Paradise 28,477 479 21 
Paso Robles 28,568 777 27 
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Pleasant Hill 46,618 1,621 40 
Rohnert Park 29,965 770 53 
San Bruno 38,851 961 45 
San Gabriel 35,607 550 53 
San Luis 
Obispo 
26,919 
1,971 53 
San Pablo 34,291 1,459 50 
Santa Paula 40,932 590 28 
Seaside 29,106 499 37 
Soledad 39,533 284 15 
South 
Pasadena 
39,882 
443 34 
Suisun City 45,854 558 21 
West 
Sacramento 
35,300 
1,458 65 
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APPENDIX E 
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